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Abstract 
 Challenged by nominal revenue growth rates in their developed home markets, many 
MNCs are enticed to drive revenue growth through geographic expansion.  Thus, for many firms, 
launching into emerging markets has become a key growth priority.  Because international 
expansion and the marketing strategy guiding it is always challenging, organizational learning is 
key.  However, researchers have yet to closely examine the relationship between organizational 
learning and marketing strategy.  This research seeks to address that gap. When firms enter new 
markets, the marketing mix framework represents a subset of decisions they must make. This 
study analyzes an MNC’s 4Ps (product, price, place, and promotion) through the lens of 
emergent strategy, exploring how an MNC’s marketing launch strategy in China emerges over 
time through knowledge acquisition.  Using the case study method, this research examines how 
four types of knowledge acquisition—congenital, vicarious, experiential, grafting, and sensing 
and noticing—influence the firm’s marketing mix to emerge and change over time.  A conceptual 
framework illustrates how each element of the marketing mix is realized or emerges through the 
four knowledge acquisition activities. 
  
  
Keywords:  Marketing Mix, Emergent Strategy, Knowledge Acquisition, Organizational 
Learning, Case Study, China, Emerging Market, Marketing Strategy 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
It is no surprise that emerging markets offer a substantial growth opportunity for 
multinational companies (MNCs).  As the PwC report, The World in 2050, projects, the world 
economy could more than double in size by 2050, with emerging markets growing twice as fast 
as advanced economies and potentially increasing their share of GDP from 35% to nearly 50% 
(PWC, 2017). These emerging economies offer a clear opportunity for MNCs. Given this 
opportunity, coupled with nominal growth rates in their developed home markets, many MNCs 
are seeking to drive revenue growth through geographic expansion.  Indeed, launching into 
emerging markets has become a key growth priority—one that is intensified by factors such as 
market attractiveness and market size.  
What is surprising is that MNCs often use market size alone as the sole determinant for 
launching into a new region, placing far less significance on the challenges entailed by 
foreignness and cultural distance (Yeniyurt, Townsend, & Talay, 2007). Enamored sheerly by 
population size, these firms often wrongly assume that success is certain through obtaining 
nominal market share.  Yet countless examples exist of brand and product launch failures into 
emerging markets. Top management teams (TMTs) often establish a local sales force despite 
knowing little about the cultural differences and market contexts affecting the habits and usages 
of local choosers and users (ch/users).  However, as firms look to expand beyond their home 
markets, understanding these issues becomes not only important, but also essential to their 
success. 
 Because economies are rapidly evolving, companies must have dynamic and flexible 
operating strategies if they are to succeed when launching into new markets (PWC, 2017). 
Although practitioners typically invest significant resources into creating marketing strategies to 
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launch in emerging markets, and researchers have analyzed the internationalization process of 
firms, the literature has yet to thoroughly examine how marketing strategies emerge over time as 
firms enter new markets. An effective market strategy requires a myriad of inputs, activities and 
insights from multiple actors.  When launching into new markets, an organization must 
continually acquire knowledge and use this learning to shape and reframe the elements of its 
marketing mix.  By examining the marketing mix framework through the lenses of both 
emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1979a, 1988) and organizational learning’s (OL’s) knowledge 
acquisition concept (Huber, 1991), this study explores how an MNC in the consumer products 
industry constructs and emerges its marketing strategy. This study seeks to advance knowledge 
by examining how scholars and marketers might employ these theories to develop marketing 
strategies for emerging markets.  
 Specifically, the study examines the MNC’s trials, tribulations, triumphs, and failures 
with an eye on the extent and impact of OL that ensues during this process, as well as how the 
marketing mix emerges over time.  The research design, guided by Mathiassen et al., (2012) 
defines the study’s composition. Figure 1 shows Mathiassen et al.’s (2012) framework along 
with related study data.
4 
 
Table 1. Research Composition (Mathiasson et al., 2012) 
 Component Definition Dissertation Approach 
P 
The problem setting 
represents people’s 
concerns in a real-world 
problematic situation 
MNCs are looking to deliver growth through 
geographic expansion.  Launching 
unfamiliar brands and product innovations in 
emerging markets is complex; TMTs 
therefore look for best practices to help them 
develop a market entry strategy with the 
highest likelihood of success. 
A 
The area of concern 
represents some body of 
knowledge within the 
literature that relates to P 
Launching in emerging markets and the 
marketing strategy; marketing mix 
 
F 
The conceptual framing 
helps structure collection 
and analyses of data from P 
to answer the research 
question (RQ); FA draws on 
concepts from A, whereas FI 
draws on concepts 
independent of A 
 
 Emergent Strategy Theory (Mintzberg) 
 Organizational Learning Theory—
Knowledge Acquisition Concept (Huber) 
M 
The adopted methods of 
empirical inquiry 
A longitudinal, qualitative case study of an 
MNCs entry into the China market 
RQ 
The research question 
relates to P, opens for 
research into A, and helps 
ensure that the research 
design is coherent and 
consistent 
RQ: How does a marketing launch strategy 
into China emerge over time via knowledge 
acquisition? 
 
C 
The contribution of the 
inquiry 
Cp:  Learnings that help marketers optimize 
a marketing strategy via knowledge 
acquisition activities prior to launching into 
emerging markets. 
Ca: Historical account of how a marketing 
strategy emerges through the OL lens  
Cf: Explore the role of knowledge 
acquisition (an OL sub-process) in the 
strategy process 
5 
 
 
This study looks to fill a gap in literature on how OL’s knowledge acquisition activities 
specifically impact the marketing mix of an MNC launching into China.  To do this, it uses the 
lens of emergent strategy theory and offers the following expected contributions to knowledge 
and practice: 1) It will examine if and how marketing mix emerges over time and influences the 
success of a global consumer products manufacturer’s efforts to launch into a foreign market.  2) 
It will explore the strategic role of distinct types of OL knowledge acquisition — congenital, 
vicarious, experiential, grafting, and searching.  3) It will provide a real-life, longitudinal case-
based examination of an MNC launching into the Chinese market.   
To begin, the study examines challenges that organizations face when launching into 
emerging markets.  It then provides an overview of the setting in which the MNC chooses to 
launch a brand into China.  Next, it offers a framework for evaluating the MNC’s marketing mix, 
using the lens of OL and emergent strategy theory, then provides an overview of its research 
methodology and data collection.  Finally, the study concludes with a discussion of findings, 
followed by its contributions and limitations. 
1.1 Problem Setting 
The study’s setting is the consumer products industry.  This is timely given MNCs 
continued and vigorous efforts to launch consumer products and brands in emerging markets 
across the globe.  Launching new products into China is a particular lure for MNCs looking to 
attain growth beyond their home markets.  With more than 1.4 billion people and a GDP growth 
rate of 6.5% (World Bank, 2016), China is a dream market for consumer product companies 
around the world.  Not only is it on course to be the world’s largest economy—forecasted to 
account for up to 20% of global GDP by 2050 (PWC, 2017)—but also, the Chinese middle class 
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continues to grow. Indeed, McKinsey & Company forecast that 76% of China’s urban population 
will be considered middle class by 2022 (Dominic Barton, 2013). Given this growth of the 
middle class and their enormous spending power, private consumption of goods and services is 
expected to rise in China.  The world’s largest population coupled with sizeable middle-class 
growth is clearly inspiring ever more growth-seeking MNCs, who often rush to launch into this 
relatively untapped market.  Yet to date, the business performance of MNCs in China has been 
mixed.  
1.2 Launching into the Chinese Market  
A common error committed by firms launching into China is duplicating the home market 
strategy with no local adaptation whatsoever. What works in the West, however, cannot be 
applied directly to Chinese launches. In fact, such an approach can be a recipe for disaster; when 
marketers fail to understand the Chinese consumer’s motivations, their products “will die a quick 
and painful death.” (Doctoroff, 2005). Such a death has befallen many MNC launches in 
China—too many to list here.  Whether due to brand names being inappropriately translated, 
products launching with little understanding of differing usage and habits of Chinese consumers, 
or simply an over simplification of cultural barriers that must be overcome, launching brands 
into China is not easy and market size alone is hardly a guarantee of success.  Several companies 
have recently announced missteps in their China entry strategies.  Netflix and Uber admitted they 
are re-evaluating their current marketing strategies due to disappointing sales results.  Even firms 
such as YUM, which previously benefited from long-term growth in China, is preparing to spin 
off its local KFC and Pizza Hut businesses based on currency devaluation and food-safety 
scandals.  Caterpillar experienced early success in the Chinese market, but is now facing the 
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stark reality of 24 straight quarters of declining sales due to slowed infrastructure growth 
(Linnane, 2016). 
Despite the challenges, China cannot be ignored by firms with global aspirations; as  
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg put it, “You can’t have a mission to want to connect everyone in 
the world and leave out the biggest country.” (Linnane, 2016). Yet companies cannot expect to be 
successful by blindly and homogeneously applying a North American or Western strategy to the 
Chinese market.  “The only way to escape the ruthless jaws of the market is to grasp [that] the 
difference between products and brands must be rooted in and built on fundamental insights.” 
(Doctoroff, 2005).  To develop effective marketing strategies, companies must stimulate both 
formal and informal learning activities.  “Insights hit the sweet spot of desire.” (Doctoroff, 
2005).  MNCs with successful brands in China evolved their marketing strategy over time.  
Starbucks attributes its success in China due its long-term commitment and to adapting strategies 
and product offerings to local markets (Wang, 2012). Successful organizations continually work 
to garner insights about the Chinese market and consumer, engaging in deep analysis and 
planning.  
1.3 Introduction: Newell Brands and Its Rubbermaid Commercial Products Division 
Newell Brands (NB) is a $15B Fortune 500 consumer goods company organized around 
16 operating divisions.  NB’s strategy, the Growth Game Plan (GGP), establishes a set of 
investment priorities for more than 50 of its major brands and places a high priority on 
geographic expansion.  Currently, 70% of NB revenue is realized in North America.  Given this, 
growth driven by geographic expansion—specifically into emerging markets such as China, 
India, and Mexico—is considered a strategic imperative to the firm’s long-term success and 
growth ambitions.  Within the GGP, Rubbermaid Commercial Products (RCP), a brand with a 
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broad product portfolio, was deemed ripe for market expansion, specifically into China.  RCP is 
both a consumer and commercial brand; it has high brand awareness and strong equity in North 
America among ch/users.  RCP plays in four key product categories: 1) refuse and recycling, 2) 
cleaning solutions, 3) mobility, and 4) food service.  Products in these categories are 
manufactured in the US and marketed to users and choosers across nine distinct verticals (see 
Figure 1).  RCP’s North America positioning is tightly tied to its leadership in innovation and 
product benefits.  “Only RCP products outperform and outlast anyone else” (#1) 1 is the brand’s 
core proposition; the foundation of its North American success is built on durability, quality, and 
innovation.  For example, the Brute® trashcan launched in 1973 and has become an icon of RCP 
in North America.  Brute was a groundbreaking trash receptacle constructed from durable 
polycarbonate materials guaranteed not to chip, crack, crush, or rust—qualities quite novel in 
comparison to its metal receptacle competitors.  This product is one of many innovations 
responsible for RCP’s heritage and reputation.  Considering its North American success, RCP has 
an eye toward global aspirations.  The growing middle class in China, along with the growth in 
its hospitality, property management, and food service verticals made it particularly appealing.  
In previous efforts, the brand had made little headway in entering countries such as China and 
Brazil.  Still, given its forecasted growth potential (Figure 2), China continued to be a priority. 
  
                                                 
 
1 The number following the quotations refers to source document from NB as set forth in the Appendices 
section 7.0 where each has an identifying number in the last column. 
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Figure 1. Rubbermaid Commercial Products—vertical priorities. (#4) 
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Figure 2. China’s GDP growth. (#4) 
2.0 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Defining the Marketing Mix 
Understanding how MNCs enter international markets and the factors that predict their 
performance continues to be a key topic among scholars and practitioners alike.  To be 
successful, organizations must have a clear understanding of consumer needs and ensure that 
they possess a compelling and relevant offering to meet those needs in the marketplace.  The 
market orientation approach has become a prominent fixture in firms, and it is widely viewed as 
critical to performance (Moorman, 1999). In essence, a market orientation philosophy focuses on 
discovering and meeting the needs of consumers.  Because this approach holds true whether the 
market is domestic or foreign, the marketing context is used here to ground the study.  The 
marketing mix (McCarthy, 1981) is a simple, widely accepted framework that practitioners rely 
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on when dealing with marketing issues.  Its key elements are known as the 4Ps: product, place, 
price, and promotion (see Figure 3).  These four elements help guide the marketing manager in 
successfully developing a strategy to target the desired customer. 
Some forums, however, debate the 4Ps’ ability to meet 21st century marketing challenges 
(Ettenson, Conrado, & Knowles, 2013).  One such challenge is that the marketing mix 
framework results in the development of narrowly focused product strategies rather than 
solutions for consumers.  Innovation and product quality have been identified as important 
contributors to brand value in industrial markets, yet some researchers deem the product itself to 
be the least important factor in the marketing mix as it relates to consumer marketing (Beverland, 
Napoli, & Lindgreen, 2007).  Perreult et al. (2014) address this challenge, stressing the 
importance of defining the target customer and reiterating that, in the marketing process, it is 
critical to understand the target consumers and their unmet needs prior to developing a 4Ps 
marketing mix. Doing so will ensure that marketers develop the right solutions and/or products 
to meet consumer needs.  Despite opposition to the marketing mix framework, it remains a 
prominent feature in both business schools and marketing practice due to its simplicity, 
applicability, and richness (Constantinides, 2006). This study uses the marketing mix framework 
because it aligns with the idea that marketing functions facilitate the link between consumer 
understanding and key processes within the firm (Day, 1990). This framework, combined with 
the OL theoretical context and emergent strategy theory, provide a rich view into an 
organization’s entry into emerging markets. 
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Figure 3. Marketing mix—strategy decision areas organized by the four Ps. (Perreault et al., 
2014) 
2.2 Emergent Strategy 
The marketing mix framework represents a subset of four decisions firms must make 
when entering new markets.  This research therefore analyzes NB’s 4Ps through the lens of 
corporate strategy.  Researchers have undertaken significant analysis of strategy creation within 
organizations (Andrews (1980); Porter (1980); Steiner (1979). These traditional views define 
strategy as a deliberate, premeditated activity focused on a firm’s intentions and equate strategy 
making with planning, positing that strategies are “formulated” before they are “implemented.” 
Mintzberg deems this strategy-making approach to be both restrictive and inconsistent with the 
current dilemmas organizations face (1979b, 1988; 1985).  He argues that viewing strategy only 
through the lens of intentions creates a gap in the understanding of a firm’s behaviors and 
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actions.  That gap results from strategy being viewed solely through the perspective of those who 
intended the strategy, rather than examining how that strategy played out over time. 
Organizations operate in dynamic and complex environments, yet the conventional view 
of strategy fails to identify how firms institute strategy changes in the face of environmental, 
leadership, or organizational forces.  Recent studies offer a novel approach to account for these 
strategic shifts.  Mintzberg (1988) suggests that strategies are not only planned, but also 
subsequently enacted and pursued. After tracking numerous organizations over time and 
analyzing their actions and behaviors, Mintzberg determined that firms form strategies in a 
variety of ways.  He contends that strategy can be both deliberate and emerging, and can be 
represented as the end points of a continuum (see Figure 4 below).  These two facets of strategy 
can help researchers and practitioners better analyze a firm’s behaviors and decisions.  Mintzberg 
defines deliberate strategies as those planned prior to implementation, and emergent strategies 
as patterns that exist and are realized despite (or in absence of) intent.  He suggests that the 
interplay between these deliberate and emergent strategies is what ultimately defines strategy 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
The concept of emergent strategy suggests a lack of neither planning nor understanding; 
it is rather an example of firms responding to their industries and being sensitive to their 
experiences.  In some situations, it is impossible for a strategist or organization to foresee the 
potential outcomes or factors that will affect a formed strategy.  Thus, rather than viewing 
strategy as solely a planning activity, Mintzberg suggests that action drives thinking rather than 
planning.  To highlight this, he uses the analogy of the potter’s wheel (1988): Potters roll clay in 
their studios to create a sculpture, continuing to think and react to stimulus in their environment, 
which might ultimately result in a structure different from the one they originally intended. That 
14 
 
is, through formulation and implementation, a fluid process of learning takes place and the 
sculpture evolves.  Similarly, as organizations learn and try new things, they eventually find 
success, and this outcome changes their strategic course (Mintzberg, 1988). 
This study uses Mintzberg’ s definition of strategy as “a pattern in a stream of decisions, 
actions, and behaviors” (1979b). It identifies and observes the actions and experiences of the 
RCP marketing strategy over time.  Emergent strategy suggests that, through implementation, 
organizations learn what works or fails through practice.  Learning is therefore a key foundation 
of the emergent strategy framework. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to advance 
knowledge by identifying how knowledge acquisition—an OL subconstruct—affects a firm’s 
marketing mix (action) and therefore how its strategy emerges over time.  
 
Figure 4. Types of strategies. (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) 
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2.3 Organizational Learning and Knowledge Acquisition 
To examine how the marketing mix emerges for an MNC entering a foreign market, this 
study applies the OL framework’s knowledge acquisition concept (Huber, 1991).  
2.3.1 Organizational learning theory. OL theory is increasingly accepted within 
international business literature as a mechanism for differentiating firm performance.  OL’s 
impact—and specifically the impact of experiential learning—is presumed to be even more 
critical and complex in the context of international expansion and success (Casillas & Moreno-
Menedez, 2014).  By engaging in international business activities, firms acquire knowledge 
about foreign markets and operations.  This, in turn, enables them to overcome the challenges of 
context—namely, unfamiliarity with foreign markets and the potential liability of foreignness.  In 
this foreign-market context, OL embraces all of the types of knowledge the firm accumulates, 
including its ability to find, analyze, and act on international issues (De Clercq, Sapienza, & 
Crijns, 2003). The learning firm continuously strives to understand international markets to 
achieve a competitive advantage in the global marketplace and, in turn, to improve its 
performance.  As defined by Levitt and March (1988), OL enables organizations to encode 
“inferences from history into routines that guide behavior.” More specifically, Huber (1991) 
notes that an organization learns if any of its units acquire knowledge that it recognizes as 
potentially useful.  
Given a firm’s unfamiliarity with the foreign market, cultures, and environments, 
international expansion and the strategy guiding it are always challenging.  OL is therefore key.  
OL’s importance also stems from the fact that firms are knowledge-creating entities  (Levitt & 
March., 1988) that acquire, assimilate, and exploit knowledge to achieve commercial ends. 
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Therefore, knowledge about foreign markets and a firm’s capability to create and use it are 
among the most important sources of that firm’s sustainable competitive advantage.  Figure 5 
shows the constructs of OL theory articulated by Huber (1991).  As the figure shows, OL has 
many subconstructs; for parsimony, this study focuses specifically on knowledge acquisition. 
 
Figure 5. Constructs and processes associated with organizational learning (blue outline 
highlights this study’s focus).  (Huber, 1991) 
 
2.3.2 Knowledge acquisition. The literature defines knowledge based on how a firm 
acquires it, dividing it into the constructs of objective and experiential knowledge (Penrose, 
1966). When firms enter new markets, they acquire objective knowledge through standardized 
methods of collecting and transmitting information (such as market research), which can be 
easily transferred to other countries and replicated by other firms.  
Experiential knowledge can be learned only by experience and is not easily transferable. 
International marketing literature posits that experiential knowledge of the market and 
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consumers, as well as problems and opportunities abroad, are acquired only by operating in the 
international market.  The literature postulates that domestic firms’ experiential knowledge 
initially reflects their operations in their home market only.  As the term suggests, experiential 
knowledge requires experience to acquire; some researchers consider it to be more important 
than objective knowledge in informing a firm’s decision making in the international business 
context (Casillas & Moreno-Menedez, 2014). Internationalization theories posit that experience 
gained from a foreign marketplace can translate into knowledge that firms can use to resolve 
problems within and select alternative options for its international operations.  In other words, 
multinational firms learn when they interact with foreign markets, respond to changes within 
them, detect problems, and act to correct them. 
This study seeks to go beyond the concepts of experiential versus objective knowledge to 
explain how knowledge is acquired and understand a firm’s performance in international 
markets.  To do this, it looks to Huber’s (1991) knowledge acquisition construct to succinctly 
define how firms acquire knowledge and provide a rich understanding of firm behavior, focusing 
on a particular firm’s marketing mix. The study framework not only examines how the firm’s 
marketing mix elements emerged, but also why the firm decided to alter its strategy. Huber’s 
approach to the OL knowledge acquisition framework provides five knowledge acquisition 
concepts: congenital, vicarious, grafted, experiential, and searching.  These concepts, which the 
researcher identified in the data and observed in practice, were helpful in defining the firm’s 
behaviors related to its emergent strategy as it launched in China.  Table 2 shows the knowledge 
acquisition definitions. 
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Table 2. Definitions of Knowledge Acquisition (Huber, 1991) 
Subconstruct of Knowledge 
Acquisition 
Definition 
Congenital 
Knowledge the firm begins with; current 
processes and understandings; current markets 
Vicarious 
Knowledge acquired by imitating and/or 
observing other firms 
Grafted 
Knowledge acquired by bringing new people 
into the organization and gleaning from their 
experiences and knowledge 
Experiential 
Learning through direct experience; intentional 
but often unintentional 
Searching/Noticing 
1) Scanning for learning 2) Focused search 
(purposeful around a specific area); proactive 
versus reactive 3) Performance monitoring 
 
 
2.4. Engaged Scholarship 
When this study began, the researcher was Senior Vice President of Marketing for RCP, 
and found the idea of combining academia with practice—specifically, with developing a 
marketing strategy to launch RCP into a China – an invigorating and extremely valuable study 
for two key reasons.  First, it offered a clear opportunity to learn from academic research and its 
implications for launching into new markets.  Theory can help practitioners understand what is 
happening in practice and provide a potentially repeatable framework that they can use to 
address the complex problems that arise while developing a marketing mix for an emerging 
market.  Second, the researcher views the business world as an exciting ground for research, as 
its real-world context provides the chance to tease out theories and test findings.  
The researcher approached this study using the lens of engaged scholarship, defined by 
Van De Ven as a form of research bringing together academia and practice (Van De Ven, 2007). 
As NB’s SVP of Marketing for RCP and an engaged scholar, the researcher chose a longitudinal 
case study method as the best approach to explore the research question. The key areas for 
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consideration were 1) access to multiple data sources offering rich insights into NB’s learning, 
knowledge acquisition activity, and marketing mix; and 2) the researcher’s ability to utilize both 
archival data and real-time observation based on her role within NB (Van De Ven, 2007). Using 
theory-driven data analysis, the study explores the type of question case studies look to answer: 
how and why questions (Yin, 1994). That is, this research seeks to understand how NB’s 
marketing launch strategy into China emerges over time via knowledge acquisition.  
Understanding how knowledge acquisition influences the elements of the marketing mix can 
promote deeper understanding of issues related to entering new markets for both scholars and 
practitioners. 
2.5 Scope and Limitations 
A known constraint of this study is that all data is archival and/or secondary, so the 
researcher was unable to administer additional surveys or interviews when certain questions or 
themes emerged that required additional information to draw conclusions.  
2.6 Summary 
By incorporating the knowledge acquisition concept into the emergent strategy theory, 
this study examines how distinct aspects of knowledge acquisition inform the marketing mix of 
an MNC entering a new market—specifically, NB launching its RCP brand into China.  This 
approach can improve understanding of how marketing strategies emerge over time and how 
companies perform within them.  The study will explore how strategies were realized or emerged 
based on NB’s application of and response to learnings, additional information, and changing 
outcomes.  That is, it will explore how knowledge acquisition shaped NB’s marketing strategy.  
Finally, this study will help researchers comprehend the intricacies of a North American brand’s 
strategy development while launching in China, as well as give marketers a framework for 
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evaluating and approaching their own market entry strategies.  Table 3 summarizes the concepts 
and constructs used for this study. 
Table 3. Key Constructs of This Study 
Themes Concepts Definitions 
Marketing Mix 
(Perreault et al., 2014) 
Product 
Decisions made in developing a physical 
good, service, or blend of both to satisfy a 
need in the target market  
Place 
Decisions involved in getting the right 
product to the target market's place, 
ensuring it is available where and when 
consumers want it 
Promotion 
Decisions made in telling the target market 
about the right product, focusing on 
acquiring new customers or retaining 
current customers 
Price 
Decisions made in setting price by 
estimating expected customer reaction to 
the total offering and the costs of getting it 
to them 
Knowledge Acquisition 
(OL sub-process) 
(Huber, 1991) 
Congenital Learning 
Knowledge the firm begins with; current 
processes and understanding of the firm and 
current markets 
Vicarious Learning 
Knowledge acquired by imitating and/or 
observing other firms 
Grafting 
Knowledge acquired by bringing new 
people into the organization and gleaning 
from their experiences and knowledge 
Experiential 
Learning through direct experience, 
intentionally or unintentionally 
Searching/Scanning 
1) Scanning for learning 2) Focused search 
(purposeful around a specific area); 
proactive versus reactive 3) Performance 
monitoring 
Strategy 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985) 
Deliberate 
Strategy is formulated/planned and then 
implemented 
Emergent 
Strategies appear without clear intentions or 
in spite of them 
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Figure 6. Proposed framework for this study. 
 
3.0 METHODOLOGY: LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY DESIGN 
3.1 Site Selection and Newell Brands Description 
NB is a $15B Fortune 500 company; it operates 16 global business segments and aspires 
to grow in emerging markets.  NB’s portfolio includes both consumer and industrial brands, as 
well as RCP, a prominent brand that represents both B2B and B2C business models.  The RCP 
division sells in key retailers such as DIY (Lowes, Home Depot) and Club channels, yet the 
brand growth potential lies heavily on the B2B side.  Developing refuse offerings and cleaning 
solutions for distributors, property owners, and/or building service contractors (BSCs) is key to 
the brand’s long-term success.  The marketing mix’s B2B aspect has an additional level of 
complexity compared to consumer brands because the offering must meet the needs of both users 
(cleaning professionals) and choosers (procurement teams, property owners, etc.).  
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NB’s stated corporate strategy placed a high priority on driving growth through 
expanding in Asian and Latin American markets.  As the SVP of Marketing for RCP, the study 
researcher was responsible for developing a marketing strategy for the brand in China.  RCP’s 
positioning in North America is tightly tied to its leadership in innovation and product benefits.  
The RCP brand is known for durability, quality, and innovation in the core categories of cleaning 
and refuse.  Based on available data, the study sought to analyze the compatibility of the 
marketing mix with ch/users in these industries. 
 Because RCP’s market development strategy is in its preliminary stages and currently 
has low brand awareness in China, it is an opportune time to evaluate its marketing mix 4Ps and 
compatibility with Chinese ch/users.  Rather than perform a post analysis on why a marketing 
mix was successful or not, the researcher was able to look both retrospectively and forward to 
evaluate RCP China marketing mix by analyzing it and how each element of the 4Ps emerges 
and/or is realized through knowledge acquisition. RCP is a prime candidate for examination as 
NB looks to conceive and implement its strategy in a worldwide setting (Aaker & 
Joachimsthaler, 1999). 
3.2 Data Collection 
Archival data informs this study, both primary and secondary.  Data comes from various 
areas of NB and includes corporate data, RCP division data, and external data from secondary 
sources and organizational partners.  Types of data analyzed include emails, strategy documents, 
presentations, press releases, annual reports, and NB-initiated studies by external research 
partners.  Organizational documents were acquired directly from NB with the top leadership 
team’s agreement.  The researcher partnered with NB’s Chief Development Officer Richard 
Davies to acquire access to the data through an official letter (sent via email) and a conversation 
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about the proposed research.   Davies provided access to historical data, as well as access to 
future data, including the numerous consumer and market studies for the RCP brand that were in 
process.  He agreed to the objectives of the research and research question, and has been 
extremely supportive of the effort, offering to help the researcher with any needs that arose 
during the process.  All information provided is owned solely by NB.  Throughout the study, the 
researcher and Mr. Davies discussed the research and its progress. 
 The research data is both qualitative and quantitative, and represents learnings and firm 
outcomes from 2003–2016.  RCP entered the Chinese market in 2003, so the data offers deep 
insights into key elements of the marketing mix at different points of time in the strategy 
implementation.  Access to previous and future consumer research studies were specifically 
useful, as RCP performed several ch/user studies over an 18-month period and the resulting data 
was useful to the topic at hand.  Newell Brands agreed to provide these studies, along with each 
study’s survey instruments, responses, and transcripts.  The Appendices (section 7) provide 
details on the RCP documents provided, including consumer studies and key information such as 
sample size, survey type, and respondent type.  Additional secondary data—including press 
releases, annual reports, and articles on NB—were also used to better understand and 
contextualize the findings.  The entirety of this data gives an historical view into NB managers’ 
decision making, as well as into how the marketing mix began and how its 4P elements were 
realized or emerged. 
As RCP’s (previous) SVP of Marketing, the researcher was both a stakeholder and 
contributor in the marketing mix development for the brand.  This allowed the opportunity to 
initiate an historical study before the outcomes of the change process had become apparent.  As 
the marketing leader on a different category in Newell Brands, the researcher continues to 
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observe the marketing mix emergence and knowledge acquisition activities in real-time as they 
unfold in the field setting (Van De Ven, 2007). Crucially, because the researcher did not have 
prior knowledge of all the outcomes of the organizational change, personal or preconceived 
biases were avoided.  The combination of archival, retrospective, and real-time data is a key 
characteristic of this study.   
3.3 Methodology 
To best comprehend how NB’s marketing mix elements emerged over time, the study uses an 
explanatory longitudinal single case study method that lets the researcher reconstruct behavior 
after the fact (Yin, 1994). Several considerations led to the choice of this approach.  First, the 
main research question seeks to understand how the marketing strategy emerges through 
knowledge acquisition, and the case study method best aligns with answering how questions 
(Yin, 1994).  Second, the goal is to understand this strategy emergence in a real-world context.  
Further, given the data available, there is no behavior control requirement (via experiments), but 
rather a requirement to understand the behaviors and how they influence elements of the 
marketing mix and RCP performance outcomes.  
The study analyzes the data in four steps that align with Mintzberg and Waters’ approach to 
understanding the emerging strategy of a retail firm (1985). First, based on the case study’s 
longitudinal nature, the study used observation and data collection to develop chronologies of the 
decisions and actions shaping RCPs marketing mix.  In this phase, the researcher identified 
trends and events, and evaluated the overall performance of RCP’s entry into China.  In this step, 
data collection focused on both US and China strategies.  This initial analysis let the researcher 
identify when the initial marketing mix was formed—along with the knowledge shaping each 
element—providing a full historical view of the RCP entry into China.  
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Next, based on the patterns of RCP decisions and actions, the study identified four stages in 
the marketing strategy, labeling each stage on a time scale (see Figure 6).  By collecting and 
organizing the data based on decisions made and key activities implemented, a clearer view of 
RCPs marketing mix began emerging.  Major periods in the firm’s history provided evidence that 
the market launch strategy emerged, changed, and developed over time. 
The researcher next investigated each period more thoroughly, probing organizational 
records, strategy documents, and RCP market research studies.  Of specific interest were key 
announcements or organizational changes that might influence the strategy.  The goal was to 
explain the major stimulus of each periodic transition and identify the underlying causes of 
strategic shifts.  In this context, major transitions were identified as significant changes in the 
marketing launch strategy via decisions made or actions taken to optimize the marketing mix. 
 
Figure 7. Phases of the RCP marketing launch strategy. 
 
Finally, the study drew on the literature to identify the concepts shaping the strategy.  With 
input from faculty advisors, the researcher interpreted the data and how it tied to theory and/or 
concepts, and then ideated various approaches to interpret and best explain the events in each 
phase.  As in Mintzberg & Rogers (1985), the study identified which of the 4Ps were emergent 
versus deliberate in each step; the goal was to explain the pattern and why the strategy changed.  
The study also identified the marketing mix’s key concepts and the types of knowledge 
acquisition informing both the mix and the identification of emergent versus deliberate strategies.  
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This research presents the results and conclusions, using the methodology described above to 
analyze RCP’s marketing mix formation.  Overall, Mintzberg’ s analogy of the potter (1988) was 
apparent. The potter—in this case, RCP—embarked, experienced unintended outcomes, and 
refined its market launch strategy accordingly.  Actors were learning. As the following results 
show, their knowledge acquisition activities and behaviors influenced the strategy throughout the 
process.   
4.0 RESULTS   
The following represents the researcher’s analysis of the emergent marketing mix as RCP 
began its entry into China from 2003–2016. As described above, the data analysis is organized in 
four temporal stages (see Figure 7). These stages highlight the key decisions and actions shaping 
the strategy and the inflection points leading to modifications in the marketing mix. The research 
identifies key challenges and brings to light opportunities for the market launch strategy based on 
the knowledge acquisition activities and behaviors in each stage. It further describes how the 
marketing mix was impacted (or not) and, specifically, which portions of the mix were realized 
or emerged. Finally, the study uses the peformance monitoring process in knowledge 
acquisition’s sensing/searching concept to understand the results of the firm’s response to the 
strategy changes.   
4.1 Overview 
NB’s approach to developing the RCP marketing strategy occured in four phases: 
1. Export Model (2003–2010):  A test-and-learn, opportunistic approach to the Chinese 
market launch. The initial marketing mix was informed by the current strategy and macro 
trends in North America.   
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2. Go Local (2011–2012): NB identifies RCP as an important brand for geographic 
expansion and sends a local management team to Shanghai to lead the China launch 
effort. A new marketing mix emerges, informed by experiential learnings from the 
internal sales team, customers, and distributors.  
3. Establish the Core (2013–2016): NB retains new marketing leadership, forms a new 
organizational structure, and establishes a common framework for market development 
grounded in consumer insights.  It applies this grafted framework to validate whether the 
marketing mix is relevant for Chinese ch/uers. It begins with a formal learning plan to 
provide the RCP team with ch/user insights aimed at identifying which marketing mix 
elements should remain and which should be altered for local needs. 
4. Global–Local/Glocal (2017 & beyond): NB launches the second phase of the grafted 
learning plan.  It augmented the quantitative learning with ethnographic research to 
understand the key attributes driving cleaning and refuse product relevance.  This 
provided robust ch/user insights, explained the “values” of clean, and highlighted the 
differences between China and the US.  These insights further informed RCP’s marketing 
mix elements. 
 
4.2 China Launch—Export Model (2003–2010) 
4.2.1 China’s market landscape: ripe for RCP launch. In 2003, NB launched the RCP 
brand into China. Given China’s GDP growth expectations and significant infrastructure growth, 
the TMT was confident that NB could handily achieve growth by launching this market.  The 
opportunities seemed endless.  RCP’s top management saw RCP as “a perfect fit to ride the 
growth with the Chinese market.” (#2)   Numerous economic factors and trends supported the 
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desire to launch. Infrastructure projects were increasing throughout the country, specifically in 
major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. (#2)  International and local hotel properties, office 
buildings, malls, hospitals, and airports—all key verticals in which RCP held a significant 
market share in North America—were also increasing.  It seemed like the perfect storm, and it 
helped assure NB of RCP’s potential for success in the Chinese region; after all, similar trends 
had driven the growth of the North American business in its onset.  Regarding the new venture, 
as one manager recalls, “the goal was to get an RCP mop and bucket in every hand” across 
China based on a “build it and they will come mentality.” (#4) 
  The idea appeared simple and intuitive enough: given the seemingly boundless rise of 
new properties, NB’s management assumed that the need for cleaning services would also rise 
and thus lead to a growing demand for premium, high-quality cleaning and refuse tools.  
Conservative projections were aimed at $100M revenue growth across five key verticals 
(hospitality, property management, health care, manufacturing, and food service) within five 
years of launch.  Because RCP had achieved remarkable success in the US—it had the #1 market 
share in cleaning and refuse categories—management posited that, given its thriving economy, a 
similar success story could be written in China.  
At the time of launch, China’s market size for RCP’s core categories was $2.2B. Given 
high fragmentation—77 local and international competitors made up only 10% of the market 
(#4)—China was ripe for an international entrant in the category. NB posited that, if RCP 
achieved a market share in China similar to what it enjoyed in the US, China would be a 
$300M+ growth opportunity. Such opportunities were few and far between across the NB 
portfolio. China’s economy was second only to the US, and its urban population was growing 
significantly, which opened up continued opportunities for the RCP product portfolio. Another 
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key growth indicator was the Chinese hotel market, which AT Kearney forecasted would grow 
near 10% annually through 2022 (#2), offering a siginificant opportunity for RCP compared to 
developed markets. Tourism was expected to rise, with 2.9 billion trips in 2012 and 10% year-
over-year growth; trip expenditures were also expected to grow. China’s National Tourism 
Administration identified a “growing demand for luxurious accommodation from affluent 
Chinese consumers” and highlighted China as the world’s third most popular destination after 
France and the US. (#2) 
RCP’s key international customers were developing strategic growth plans for China as 
well.  InterContinental Hotels Group forecasted that, by 2025, China would surpass the US as its 
largest market (based on number of rooms). Starwood expected to double its footprint by 2015, 
while Sheraton planned to open approximately one hotel every three weeks in the Chinese 
market through 2017.  Commercial properties, such as office buildings and malls, were on the 
rise in both square footage and number of properties. RCP had many international contracts with 
hotel properties, mall developers, and property management firms (such as CBRE). RCP 
management believed that these contracts could be enforced with the local Chinese buyers, so 
the selling process would be very straightforward and similar to that in the US. 
4.2.2 Review of knowledge acquisition realized in Export Model phase—congenital 
learning.   Prior to entering the Chinese market, NB did little research or groundwork to validate 
the RCP opportunity in China.  Management determined that cleaning was “universal” and 
decided to launch the full US product offering into China using the US marketing mix.  Given 
China’s significant growth rates, speed to market was given priority.  By applying the 4Ps of the 
US marketing mix to China, RCP entered the market quickly, confident it would experience 
immediate growth.  NB set up a Hong Kong sales office and hired 19 sales people, training the 
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teams on product, and providing them with US product catalogs.  RCP had officially entered 
China. 
In this phase, the market entry strategy was quite simple: build a sales force—known as 
“feet on the street”—and ensure product availability through distributors.  The sales force 
decided to target distributors supplying paper products (such as 3M), as these products were sold 
in hotels, offices, and other properties that RCP was targeting. This appeared to be the best 
approach, as “cleaning products could ride the truck” with consumable products that building 
service contractors and properties ordered on a regular basis.  The teams focused on opening new 
accounts and aimed their efforts at landing orders for new construction and building renovation 
projects. By achieving opening orders for new builds and renovations, the team assumed the 
replenishment orders would follow. The sales team was able to secure new projects, however, 
loyalty and replenishment orders proved difficult.   
Another key piece of the strategy focused on key international accounts—such as IHG, 
Starwood, Yum Brands, and McDonald’s—that RCP had relationships and contracts with in the 
US.  The management team believe these contracts would be viable in the Chinese market, thus 
providing the opportunity for an immediate customer base in China.  This core belief of the 
Export Model strategy informed NB’s decision to keep the 4Ps in China similar to those in the 
US marketing mix.   
4.2.3 RCPs initial entry marketing mix. As previously mentioned, RCP market entry 
and business model for China was informed by the success built in North America, and thus few 
adaptations were made for the new market. Three key factors drove this reasoning: 1) Many of 
the properties developed in China were international hotels that RCP already had global contracts 
with, so the team felt it would be relatively “turn-key” to enforce these contracts in the region. 2) 
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An assumption was made about the “universal nature” of the cleaning process and the tools 
required to clean properties. 3) Management believed that Chinese ch/users would value cleaning 
tools from a US brand that were made in the US, and that RCP could set the standard for 
cleaning tools in the market.  Following is a detailed view of RCPs initial marketing mix, which 
was informed by congenital learning—that is, it was grounded and informed by RCP’s processes 
in and current understanding of the North American market. 
4.2.3.1. Product. RCP’s entire North American catalog of more than 10,000 items—98% 
of which were manufactured in the US—was immediately offered to distributors in China. The 
products offered in China were not adapted for local users or the local properties in which they 
were used. The breadth of RCP’s product offering was deemed an advantage in North America; 
as a salesperson noted, that breadth established RCP as a 
 
“one stop shop for North American distributors, who did not want to purchase cleaning 
and refuse products from multiple manufacturers, reduced the complexity and cost of 
doing business with multiple brands.” (#2) 
 
In North America, based on market needs, the size of the RCP catalog and product offering grew 
over many years. In China, the 10,000-item catalog was problematic for sales team members, as 
it made it difficult for them to focus on the “core” product offering, offer recommendations, and 
build assortments or solutions for specific customers.  Given this, they sold items 
opportunistically, allowing distributors and property owners to skim catalogs and “cherry pick” 
the line. 
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4.2.3.2. Pricing. During the Export Model phase, RCP priced its products as a straight 
conversion from US pricing to Chinese currency.  This put RCP products at a significant price 
premium compared to the competition—especially locally made products. It was not difficult for 
choosers to find substitutes for the RCP product offerings, as hundreds of Chinese manufacturers 
were making similar products.  Although the quality of local manufacturers was not nearly to 
RCP’s standard, the product form and functionality was similar, and RCP did little to validate 
why its brand was superior for the market and thus worth the premium price. On average, RCP 
was charging a 100–200% price premium for like products in the local market. Beyond list 
pricing, RCP terms favored the North American business model.  Chinese distributors were 
invoiced in US dollars and responsible to pay freight and duties.  Payment terms were cash in 
advance to 60 days, yet lead times on products were two to six months.  RCPs approach to list 
pricing plus additional duties was extremely uncompetitive and burdensome for local business 
owners. 
4.2.3.3. Place. Similar to the North American strategy, products were broadly available 
across mainland China, without a specific focus on regions or key major cities.  Beyond 
geography, RCP did not initially prioritize specific verticals to focus entry efforts, so sales teams 
were expected to target the same nine verticals in which RCP played in North America. This was 
a broad target and geography for the 19 sales managers to cover; by comparison, the North 
American sales team had hundreds of sales managers to service the nine verticals across that 
(much smaller) region. Because RCP operates under a B2B model, the focus in China was to 
open as many distributors as possible, with little consideration about the type of distributors. In 
summary, NB applied a broad-based approach to the place element of the RCP marketing mix. 
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4.2.3.4. Promotion. As with the other marketing mix elements, RCP adopted the current 
North American promotional model. In 2003, RCP was an established brand in North America 
built over 45 years. US promotion efforts were thus focused primarily on the trade (i.e., the 
choosers) via selling events, trade shows, and catalog distribution/mailings.  The North American 
business was built over time via relationships between distributors and the sales team, which was 
extremely seasoned; many sales people had been in their postions for 10–20 years. As a result, 
little priority was given to advertising or to awareness- and trial-building efforts. In the US, RCP 
benefited from high brand awareness (90% aided), partly due to the strength of the Rubbermaid 
consumer brand, which had mass distribution of a range of products in mass retailers across the 
US and Canada. 
Despite having low brand awareness in China, NB adopted a promotional model similar 
to that in the US.  The focus was based on trade shows, catalog distribution, and professional 
seminars.  The sales team worked to build relationships with key distributors, which proved 
difficult given the product and pricing disadvantages compared to local competitors. The brand 
also participated in more than 20 trade shows a year to provide catalogs and meet directly with 
new distributors and property owners.  Table 4 summarizes NB’s Export Model marketing mix. 
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Table 4. Marketing Mix—Export Model 
Marketing Mix 2003–2010 
Export Model 
Product Pricing Promotion Place 
US product only US pricing in US 
currency 
Catalogs All cleaning and 
paper products 
distributors 
10,000+ item product 
line  
Significant premium 
(100–200%) vs. local 
market 
Seminars All verticals 
 Customer responsible 
for US customs, 
duties, and taxes  
Tradeshows All of mainland 
China 
 Cash-in-advance 
payment terms 
Manufacturer’s 
website 
 
 
4.2.4 Performance monitoring of organizational results. Initially, NB specifically 
monitored RCP performance in China on key metrics such as sales revenue and market share. 
Although the brand experienced revenue growth from 2003–2010, the sales were extremely 
small relative to the market size of $2.2B USD. Sales growth was not pacing with the category or 
GDP growth, and RCP attained less than a 1% market share over seven years. In 2008, sales 
plateaued at approximately $8M (see Table 5).  During the Export Model period, sales were 
sustained mostly through new property openings rather than reorders or replenishment from 
previous customers.  Therefore, the current marketing mix elements did not achieve a sustainable 
growth model.  
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Table 5. RCP Revenue Results (#2) 
 2003–2008 2008–2010 
Net Sales (in millions) Data unavailable 
Average Annual Sales 
$8.0M 
YOY Growth N/A Flat YOY Growth 
Market Share  < .5% 
 
4.2.4 Summary—Export Model phase. During this phase, few changes were made to 
the marketing mix 4Ps, despite feedback from the sales team and its key customers. The 
organization continued to focus on opening new accounts, and on new construction and 
renovation opportunities. The RCP management team at that time did little to understand why the 
business was underperforming; it simply assumed the sales force was inexperienced and needed 
additional training or perhaps was not the right talent at all. No additional resources or 
investment were put into the region. During this time period, the division treated the Chinese 
market opportunistically rather than strategically.  Because RCP was performing well and driving 
consistent growth in North America, there was little urgency or priority to fix the China strategy.   
RCP operated the region at status quo and, given the past performance, planned the China 
business at nominal growth rates. 
4.3 China Launch—Go Local (2011–2012) 
As the above discussion shows, during the first phase, RCP was quite difficult to do business 
with and did not appropriate resources to determine how to succeed in the Chinese market.  At 
the time, the RCP leadership team niavely assumed that the North American marketing mix 
would work in the region and that the market’s macro trends would ensure continual sales 
growth. This strategy did not show a deep understanding of the context of doing business with 
Chinese distributors or of how to meet local users’ needs. So, despite macro trends, infrastructure 
36 
 
growth, and an increasing China GDP—all of which point in favor of RCP—the desired business 
results did not follow.  
4.3.1 Changes in NB’s top management team. In 2011, NB hired a new CEO with 
signficiant global experience in product and advertising development.  In an NB investor press 
release announcing his appointment, the new CEO highlighted his aspiration for the NB portfolio 
to grow in developed and emerging markets: 
  
“I am honored to be joining Newell. The company has a strong portfolio of brands and an 
excellent leadership team with a great opportunity to win in both the developed and emerging 
markets.” (Neff, 2011) 
 
Upon his arrival, a new corporate strategy was developed, coined the Growth GamePlan (see 
Figure 8). This growth plan highlighted the organization’s ambition to position key brands for 
geographic expansion, specifically in emerging markets. Identified as “Extend Beyond Our 
Borders,” this part of the GGP focused specifically on Asia and Latin America. The vision was to 
give these key brands the resources, people, and insights needed to drive exponential growth 
outside of their home markets. This beyond-borders extension was not meant for all brands in the 
portfolio; instead, the GGP identified specific brands that NB leadership believed were poised 
for growth. An NB leader explained the plan for these “win bigger” brands as follows:  
 
“…. the aim is for them to drive growth at the division over the next five years.  A big 
part of the strategy will be the development of these brands in emerging markets.  80% of 
Sharpie’s sales, for example, are generated in the North American market.  The short-
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term objective is to now develop Sharpie in Latin America, building on the relative 
strength of Paper Mate in that region.” (2012 Annual Report, 2013) 
As Figure 8 shows, RCP was identified as a win bigger business.  Based on this classification, it 
was a corporate priority for RCP to accelerate its growth in both the Asian and Latin American 
markets.  An optimized strategic plan for RCP China was identified as a key priority to better 
meet the needs of ch/users in the market.  The TMT also identified the investment and resources 
that would be required to deliver this global growth across all win bigger brands.   
NB quantified the incremental investment needed in sales and marketing efforts to deliver 
sustainable growth in emerging markets (see Figure 9).  To fund this investment, NB planned to 
identify sensible ways to reduce costs in developed markets to fund the resource requirements of 
launching into emerging markets.  This was a significant shift for the organization for two 
reasons.  First, in the past, individual divisions or brands made discreet decisions around their 
own specific global growth strategies—something corporate leadership was now prescribing.  
Second, divisions with new-market expansion plans were not previously given additional 
resources to do so; rather, they were expected to self-fund their expansion.  In this new model, 
NB planned to over-invest in win bigger businesses, funded by cost-cutting measures across the 
portfolio.  It also emphasized a local approach in the new markets: “local needs and local price 
points” (see Figure 9).  This new approach required a significant shift in the RCP Chinese 
expansion, along with a review of its marketing mix elements.  
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Figure 8.  Newell’s Growth Game Plan. ("Newell Rubbermaid - Barclays Back-to-
School Consumer Conference," 2013) 
 
 
Figure 9. Newell’s focus on emerging market investment. ("Newell Rubbermaid - 
Barclays Back-to-School Consumer Conference," 2013) 
39 
 
 
4.3.2 Review of knowledge acquisition behaviors—experiential. The new NB 
leadership believed that RCP had the potential to be a big player in the Chinese market.  Macro 
economic trends were still favorable for the RCP business model and product portfolio, yet little 
research or data had been used to validate the opportunity. Given the new corporate strategy and 
the RCP brand’s disappointing sales and penetration in the market over the previous eight years, 
NB’s TMT decided to establish a new leadership team for the China RCP business and sent top 
high-potential talent to the region. These leaders possessed successful track records in other 
divisions in developed markets; they were sent as expatriates to evaluate the China marketing 
strategy and make recommendations on driving growth and strategy refinement. They were then 
expected to execute their recommendations and deliver exponential growth to the organization.  
This team was also entrusted to lead the existing local teams and ensure they had the training and 
skills needed for success. NB leaders deemed ears and feet on the ground as necessary to get the 
region on track.   
One of the first decisions the new leadership team made was to move the RCP division office 
from Hong Kong to Shanghai so that it would be physically operating in the local market. It also 
hired local talent for key positions, though many members of the top leadership team in areas 
such as General Management, Sales, Finance, and Marketing were employees relocated from the 
US or other developed markets. As described in the next section, the new team immediately 
worked to gain a better understanding of RCP’s performance and the challenges to be overcome 
in China. These learnings were garnered through first-hand experiences spending time in the 
field and on sales calls, and through discussions with RCP’s internal sales team and with 
distributors and key choosers from international MNCs. 
40 
 
 
4.3.3 Challenges with the Export Model marketing mix.  Throughout this phase of 
RCP’s launch into China, experiential learning was taking place.  The new leadership team and 
local sales team consistently received feedback from distributors and customers on the pros and 
cons of doing business with RCP.  Overall, the feedback was challenging; in addition to 
introducing a western, developed marketing mix into the under-developed Chinese market, RCP 
also made it extremely difficult for local Chinese owners and operators to do business with the 
firm.  Policies put in place were advantageous for the firm, but did not favor local choosers or set 
up RCP for sustainable growth.  Following are summaries of some key experiential learnings that 
RCP employees gained about the Export Model marketing mix elements. 
4.3.3.1. Product. RCP definitely had an opportunity to leverage the marketing mix’s 
product area. Although customers had many positive things to say about the brand and its 
products, challenges existed and needed to be addressed.  Still, distributors and choosers noted 
that market dynamics and elevated operating standards were opening a door for premium 
products such as RCP in the refuse and cleaning categories:  
 
“Higher-value products are preferred. Complicated and rigorous working conditions 
demand better durability and functionality. High hygiene standards are applied in 
properties which thus demand better durability and safety.” (#4) 
 
Many distributors understood RCP’s performance and quality, yet they were not always valued 
or understood by local customers, many of whom preferred local brands despite the positive RCP 
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proposition. It also appeared that Chinese choosers were not decidedly loyal to any one brand.  
Two local distributors summarized the situation as follows: 
  
“RCP products have strong awareness and performance only in global chain accounts due 
to their mature operation and quality-inspection system, which help properly showcase 
RCP’s value. Local competitors—such as Safco, Baiyun, and Chaobao—have similar 
products and are preferred by local chains.” (#4) 
 
“RCP products have the best quality, especially in the refuse segement, but the focus is 
less on brands than product qualities. If relevant cleaning products produced by local 
manufacturers have almost the same quality as RCP, local products are preferred.” (#4) 
 
Further, despite acknowledging RCP’s value, local competitors received accolades for 
their attention to services beyond product offerings, including trainings and certifications.  These 
competitors typically visited choosers more often and identified ways to service accounts beyond 
replenishment and replacement orders. RCP was finding it difficult to build these strategic 
partnerships and relationships. In addition, local manufacturers were nimble and more than 
willing to manufacture customer-specific requests and product adaptations. Because RCP 
manufacturing operations were based solely in the US, it was impossible to react and adapt as 
quickly as local competitors. One distributor discussed the needs of local accounts and how this 
compared to those of international accounts:  
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“Local chain accounts value SOP [standard operating procedures], leasing, and services 
that better support brand quality and a professional image; global chain accounts do not 
value such add-on services due to their mature operations and quality inspection 
systems.” (#4) 
 
Another distributor described the value of local competitors and their commitment to service:  
 
“Local brands are willing to provide differentiating products and services. They offer 
regular visits to introduce product knowledge and customer insights—one to two times 
per month—and timely response (within three days) to inquiries about product quality or 
logistics…. Baiyun and Trust are observed to visit distributors every time a batch of 
products is delivered.” (#4) 
 
4.3.3.2. Place. Although RCP quality and brand awareness among many distributors were 
strong, customers were clearly disappointed with other elements of the marketing mix—
specifically, brand availability and pricing.  These challenges were hindering the firm’s ability to 
grow through repeat users.  Distributors were reluctant to recommend RCP due to unstable lead 
times, which directly affected a property’s daily operations. RCP’s service was unpredictable. 
Distributors had their reputations to protect and it would reflect poorly on them if they were 
unable to deliver to their customers’ expectations.  As one wholesaler noted, “RCP does not have 
full SKUS, and unstable lead times affect a store’s daily operations.” (#4)  
The logistical challenges and long lead times were caused by US manufacturing, which 
was a key element of the current market strategy. Even key international accounts that RCP had 
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global contracts with highlighted their need for relationships with multiple brand manufacturers. 
This unpredictability was negatively impacting a key tenant of RCP’s initial entry strategy: to 
leverage long-standing US relationships with global brands.  One key international customer 
described the need to work with local competitors, despite contractual agreements with RCP in 
the US: 
 
“RCP is the best brand in the world, with long and stable relationship with McDonald's. 
However RCP is weak in logistics and supply, which is the main reason we have other 
MNC suppliers.” (#4) 
 
 Beyond logistics challenges, it was obvious that Chinese choosers did not feel required to 
uphold global contracts. RCP had pricing and placement agreements with many global hotel 
brands and food service properties. In the US, these contracts were upheld and enforced with 
regional buying teams, and it was extremely rare for a chooser to deviate from a global contract.  
The new China leadership team was surprised to learn that these key accounts did not have 
similar compliance measures outside the US, where brands and product specfications in MNC 
procurement catalogs were more of a suggestion than a requirement.  A major coffee chain and 
key US customer gave its local China teams full control of brand and supplier decisions: 
 
“Global HQ decides the product models and material requirements and the China 
sourcing department decides the brand and suppliers.”(#4) 
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4.3.3.3. Promotion. As previously discussed, RCP executed a limited promotional 
strategy and relied mostly on trade shows, catalog mailings, and its own website to build brand 
awareness. This strategy, paired with strong selling relationships, was a successful model for the 
US. However, with such limited brand awareness in China, additional tactics to grow the brand 
were needed. A big gap identified by the new China leadership was the need to provide products 
for trial and testing.  Based on RCP’s premium price points, many buyers wanted their users to 
test the products and interact with them prior to purchase. Such trialing could help substantiate 
RCP’s premium pricing, illustrating the higher quality and superior product design compared to 
the competition. Further, RCP’s competitors had sophisticated and frequent trial programs 
focused on local businesses. These local businesses had limited financial resources, so it was 
important for choosers and users to interact with new products first-hand prior to investing in 
them. One distributor explained how RCP’s competitors approached this: 
 
“The brand supplier visits with free trial products, which is valued by local buyers as it 
helps with brand awareness and promotion, better product knowledge and understanding, 
and quality evaluation…. Trust, Baiyun, and Miajie [competitors] all provide free trial  
products for distributors to try, or they give them out to end buyers to pitch new 
customers on product upgrades.” (#4) 
 
The power of word-of-mouth was also a key factor that RCP had not previously taken 
into account.  Chinese distributors, while competitors, are a tight-knit community. Many of them 
had built their businesses along side of each other and were self-made. They compared notes on a 
brand’s quality, service, pricing, and so on. Many communicated not only face to face, but also 
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through a Chinese social networking site called WeChat. Experiences with specific brands would 
be posted online and shared for their distributor networks to see. Speaking of manufacturer sites 
and social sites, one distributor noted the following: 
   
“The internet is an important source for primary brand and product information collection 
immediately after hearing of a brand and product for the manufacturing end buyer.” (#4) 
 
Due to word-of-mouth on social networks, RCP’s logistical challenges became widely known 
across the distributor community, which created barriers to opening new customers. 
 
4.3.3.4. Price. Based on many of the issues described above, RCP’s 100–200% pricing 
premium and additional business costs, such as duties and terms, were difficult for Chinese 
choosers to justify when compared to the competition: 
 
 “A reasonable retail price, not exceeding the buyer’s highest acceptable price, is 
important in order to justify brand choice.” (#4)  
 
This was an additional hindrance for the sales team in opening new accounts and 
sustaining current customers. The new RCP China leadership team analyzed all product sales 
between 2003 and 2011 and found that approximately 80% of those sales were realized with a 
price exception or discount. Leadership decided that pricing must be addressed for RCP to be 
competitive. Even customers with pricing contracts expected their local teams to engage in a 
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rigorous bidding process to achieve the best price and did not accept contract pricing at face 
value. A distributor highlighted this process as follows: 
 
“Once global chains identify preferred brands for procurement, local teams adopt a 
bidding process  to acheive  lowest price. In China, the sourcing department has the most 
decision power in this bidding process.” (#4) 
 
4.3.4 Summary of experiential learnings.  The new RCP China leadership team 
acquired invaluable learnings through both first-hand experience and the experiences of local 
sales teams.  The leadership team identified many opportunities for improvement and took 
immediate actions across all elements of the marketing mix based on its findings. Although the 
2003 initial marketing mix provided a foundational framework for the brand, it did not account 
for the local nuances of the Chinese market.  That initial approach applied a strategy 
implemented by an established brand in a developed market; the variables simply were not the 
same in China, where the brand was scarcely known and the cleaning and refuse requirements of 
local ch/users were not as sophisticated as in a developed market.  Unlike in the US, China had 
no formal cleaning standards or operating procedures, no governing bodies to regulate cleaning 
standards, and no recycling/refuse collection efforts.  Therefore, most of the RCP product 
offering was deemed unnecessary. This became apparent when the new China leadership team 
analyzed the product mix sold in the region since 2003. Of the 10,000 products offered in the 
RCP catalog, only 954 were actually ordered—and an even smaller number were consistently 
reordered. Clearly, the broad product offering was not translating to the local market.  Table 6 
summarizes the experiential learnings from this phase 
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Table 6. Summary of Experiential Learnings 
 
 
4.3.5  The NEW Go-Local marketing mix.  Based on the leadership team’s experiential 
learnings, a new marketing mix emerged. The RCP leadership team took immediate action to 
optimize each 4P element to better align with the market’s needs.  One essential high-level 
principle the team applied to the marketing mix was focus.  The initial marketing mix mirrored 
the US market, which was fully developed and had significantly more resources than the China 
region.  To be successful in China, the leadership team decided to narrow the market entry 
approach—specifically in relation to product offering and place (distribution)—to better suit the 
needs of the sales team, distributors, and ch/users. The product offering was minimized to a core 
offering targeted to the hospitality and property management verticals.  By focusing specifically 
on two verticals, rather than nine, the sales and marketing teams could hone their efforts and 
deepen their knowledge. Further, to help the sales team make more salient recommendations to 
their customers, new selling tools were developed.  
Market Entry Strategy Experiential Learning
Only 946 unique  products of the 10,000 skus were ordered over the 
9 year period.
Less than 20% of the 946 items were considered “hero” or "leading" 
products of the brand as defined by NA sales. 
Products were shipped from US and RCP communicated a 2- 6 
month lead time.
Distributors were able to get similar products from competitors in 30 
days or less.
Place
Cleaning & Paper Products Distributors across all verticals in 
Mainland China.
A total of 18 distributors listed RCP products and sold to end-users. 
Majority of sales were in top 5 cities.
Pricing was a straight conversion from US pricing to Chinese 
currency, resulting in a 100% -200% premium versus market 
average price.
70% of orders received included some sort of pricing exception with 
an average discount of 35%.
Payment terms ranged from cash in advance to 60 days payment 
upon order placed.
Distributors were self-made businessmen with little cash on hand 
and unable to pay cash in advance, especially considering the 2-6 
lead time.
Payment terms – all payments required in US $ currency Few distributors had the ability to pay for products in US currency.
Distributors were unable to justify the premium price of the product 
based on limited product knowledge and training.
Sales team was not equipped with appropriate selling tools.
Little brand awareness of RCP brand outside of the international 
firms.
Full RCP NA Product portfolio available to the Chinese market 
which consisted over 10,000 items.
Limited marketing tools were created by the RCP marketing team.  
Solely  the basics were provided such as RCP catalogs (in 
English), trade shows, seminars, and website. 
Product
Price
Promotion
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The logistical challenges that customers had highlighted encouraged the RCP leadership 
team to request resources to open a local distribution center in Shanghai. NB granted this 
request, and the distribution center was born.  It housed 528 core products, dramatically 
upgrading their availability: products that previously took anywhere from two to six months 
when shipping from the US were now available in three to seven days. This gave distributors 
confidence in recommending RCP products and touting the reliability of its operations. 
Pricing was also adjusted during this phase.  Not only did the leadership lower list prices 
by 30%, it changed billing to local currency and made payment terms more acceptable to small 
business owners.  RCP also took on the customs and freight payments, which customers were 
previously expected to pay. These pricing changes put RCP at a much more acceptable pricing 
strategy in relation to its competitors. Although still priced at a premium, leadership viewed this 
premium as warranted given RCP products’ superior quality, functionality, and design. The 
leadership further realized that it was critical for ch/users to experience this product quality first-
hand. It therefore put trialing programs in place to get products in the hands of potential ch/users.  
The marketing team identified 10 iconic RCP products and developed a trial program that 
let users experience these products for free.  These programs not only provided the products, but 
also training documents and videos to teach users how to use them appropriately.  Sales team 
members then scheduled follow-up visits to ensure that customers were satisfied with their 
experiences; the sales team could then immediately convert those experiences into orders. RCP 
also developed PR and activation initiatives focused on building brand awareness and solidifying 
its expert status in the cleaning industry. Table 7 shows a summary of the 4Ps for the new 
marketing mix. 
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Table 7. Marketing Mix—Go Local 
 
4.3.6 Performance monitoring of organizational results. These changes improved the 
brand’s revenue growth trajectory in China.  Sales that previously plateaued at $8M began 
showing signs of reinvigoration.  Distributors responded positively to the RCP improvements.  
Relocating the office and building a warehouse in Shanghai showed local customers that RCP 
was making a long-term investment in the region.  RCP gained creditability with the customer 
base, and local sales team members gained confidence in their selling abilities due to better 
pricing and training tools.  These were positive signs, and NB’s management continued to invest 
in RCP to build the brand in the market. 
Table 8. Sales Results 2012–2013 (#2) 
 2012 2013 
Net Sales (in millions) $8.20 $10.6 
YOY Growth — +28% 
 
 
Product Pricing Promotion Place
Continued with US 
developed and manufactured 
product only
Lowered prices by 
approximately 30% which 
closed gap to market pricing, 
resulting in a 20% premium 
to market average
PR and Marketing activation 
focused on building brand 
awareness and industry 
expertise
Opened  local Shanghai 
warehouse to improve 
product availability to 
distributors 3-7 days (versus 
2 - 6 months)
Limited focus to 528 core 
products versus 10,000 items
Changed billing to local 
currency and improved 
payment terms to 45 days
Initiated Trial Programs to 
get products in 
users/choosers hands to 
experience the superior 
quality and functionality of the 
brand
43 Distributors targeted 
Property Management and 
Hospitality Verticals with a 
focus on international 
contracts
New product offering 
specifically focused on 
Property Management and 
Hospitality verticals
RCP took on payment 
responsibility of freight and 
duties
 New selling tools developed 
to support sales team in 
recommending ideal products 
for Hospitality and Property 
Management verticals
Focused sales force on top 5 
cities versus all of mainland 
China
2011-2012
GO LOCAL
Marketing Mix Strategy
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4.4 China Launch—Establish the Core (2013–2016) 
The new RCP China marketing strategy was building momentum. However, while the 
leadership team was gaining knowledge through its experience on the ground, it had very little 
expertise launching in foreign markets. So, while its understanding of the market was growing 
and the marketing mix elements were optimized, the team’s approach nonetheless contained a 
good amount of trial and error and it was taking some time to get up to speed. NB, however, 
expected the team to move quickly to leverage the Chinese market’s opportunities. 
 In 2013, NB’s CEO appointed a new leadership team underneath him and announced a 
new structure to operationalize the GGP. The corporate strategy was in full effect, and the 
organization continued to put significant emphasis on expanding the priority brands’ geographic 
footprint.  In a 2014 trade article, a new leadership team member highlighted the current CEO’s 
progress in emerging markets: 
  
“He sped up the marketing group within emerging markets in Asia and South America. 
He doubled the ad budget and doubled the market research investment. It’s all toward 
creating a brand and innovation led company famous for great design and product 
performance.” (Overby, 2014) 
 
Leadership’s desire to build a strong foothold outside the US remained strong, but they began to 
realize that NB needed local talent, specifically in marketing: 
 
“About 71% of our business is in North America, but we see significant opportunities 
particularly in South America and Asia. We are building marketing hubs in Sao Paolo and 
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Shanghai, as well as in London. We’re recruiting local professionals to help us on that 
journey. Our ability to be able to build marketing hubs in the future will be critical.” 
(2012 Annual Report, 2013) 
 
Many of the new NB leaders had strong consumer packaged goods (CPG) backgrounds, 
including at Unilever, Kraft, and P&G. One key leadership team hire was Chief Marketing and 
Insights Officer Richard Davies, who had strong marketing expertise and previous experience in 
launching new markets, specifically in Asia:  
 
“Davies proven track record of creating brands and bringing innovation to the consumer 
combined with his experiences living and working in markets around the world, make 
him the ideal leader to take Newell Rubbermaids’s marketing and innovation agenda to 
the next level…. Richard is a noted expert on the consumer market in East Asia and has 
lived and worked across the region in his 30 year career.” (Neff, 2014) 
 
Davies noted his passion for building brands outside of US, and said he was keen to apply his 
experiences to NB: 
 
“I was lucky at Unilever to work in Japan. The Japanese consumer is one of the most 
discerning in the world. The quality of work in Japan is incredibly high, and that has 
conditioned them to expect very high standards. There was a sense of satisfaction in 
being able to market to consumers and get it right.” (Overby, 2014) 
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With Davies’ appointment, NB implemented a new marketing structure.  Previously, 
marketing and consumer insight talent reported through individual business segments.  This 
talent now reported directly to Davies, ensuring that he could personally lead the marketing 
strategy for each NB business unit. This reporting structure was a departure from other CPG 
companies in the industry, as well as for NB. Previously, the NB CMO was responsible for 
capability building, but decisions ultimately remained with the business units. Davies did not 
deem this as particularly useful in keeping marketing spend and decisions aligned with NB’s 
corporate priorities: 
 
 “…(the CMO) was developing capabilities, processes and training, but the marketing 
organization had no central authority. Instead it was divided among business units that 
controlled their own marketing budgets and decisions… many brands were relying on 
consumer-habit studies that were 10 years old. Marketing people and spend weren’t 
aligned with company priorities such as growing in Asia, and Latin America…” (Overby, 
2014). 
 
The new marketing structure let Davies set the agenda for learning plans and marketing 
strategies. He was extremely passionate about validating marketing mix decisions with 
consumers (in RCP’s case, with ch/users). His previous experience and techniques informed new 
processes and approaches for NB marketing teams.  His philosophy differed from his 
predecessor, and the new processes, skills, and capabilities were grafted into the organization. 
4.4.1. Grafting: Developing a learning plan to inform marketing strategy. Davies 
instituted new processes for market development.  Throughout his career, he had launched 
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brands in new markets, including China.  Through his experiences in different markets and 
varying roles, he developed a framework and methodology for launching into new markets.  The 
marketing strategies were grounded in data—specifically, in consumer insights.  When reviewing 
the RCP China strategy, Davies immediately ensured that priority was placed on investing in 
consumer understanding, which he viewed as critical to success for all marketers:  
 
“The reality is that a lot marketers are not overly interested in understanding the 
consumer. They are just paying lip service to the consumer. But at the end of the day, it’s 
the depth or complete lack of consumer understanding that will determine your success or 
failure. That was true 40 years ago and it will remain true 40 years from now.” (Neff, 
2014) 
 
Over the previous eight years in China, RCP had conducted no formal research with ch/users of 
cleaning and refuse products.  All marketing strategy decisions had been based on the North 
American strategy and, more recently, on the local team’s experiential learnings.  As a result, 
most information was anecdotal and not necessarily generalizable for the Chinese market as a 
whole.  
 Under Davies’ leadership, a new approach to consumer understanding and entering new 
markets was grafted onto the organization.  The processes were mandatory across all of NB.  In 
Davies’ view, it was critical that all brands and markets in the NB portfolio apply the same 
principles to understand consumers and inform the marketing mix: 
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“My predecessor was responsible for marketing as a capability, developing skills and 
training. I am responsible for that, but I also look after the day job of marketing. I’m 
responsible for the advertising and mix development. And that’s really helpful, because as 
we develop new approaches, processes, and techniques, I don’t need to persuade people 
to do it, that it’s a good idea. I can tell them to do it. Certainly for a company our size, we 
don’t have the time to go around trying to influence people that this is how they should 
do things…” (Overby, 2014) 
 
4.4.2  Sensing and searching—product quantitative testing and insights. Davies 
immediately influenced the RCP China marketing mix by developing a learning plan to better 
understand local consumer needs.  He instituted a new process for testing products with 
consumers: 
  
“Davies wants product concepts and ad ideas tested with consumers… because 
researchers are the voice of the consumer.” (Neff, 2014) 
 
After reviewing the category and conducting local field visits, Davies voiced concerns 
about the product offering’s suitability for the Chinese market.  The goal was to immediately 
ascertain if the current product offerings were relevant and differentiated—and solved the needs 
of both choosers and users.  A key facet of Davies’ new marketing structure was an independent 
consumer insight function to implement learning plans and guide the methodologies used to gain 
consumer insights. Davies was adamant that consumers be the voice informing strategic 
direction and decisions, and the consumer insights function facilitated this: 
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“You lose count of the number of companies who claim the consumer is boss, but the 
question is do they really make the consumer the boss or not?  I think by having a strong 
independent research function you’re a hell of a lot closer to doing that.” (Overby, 2014) 
 
Although testing product concepts with consumers was a well-known approach among 
CPG companies, RCP had never tested its current products with consumers in the US or China.  
Davies deemed this testing to be both critical and urgent.  It was foundational—not only to 
inform the China marketing mix and ensure that products were meeting Chinese ch/users’ needs, 
but also to determine whether the brand should even be in China at all.  The goal of the testing 
was to identify whether the products currently sold in the region were the “right” ones, especially 
since they were all developed in the US for US consumers.  If the current product offering did 
not meet the needs of local ch/users, the rest of the marketing strategy was moot as new 
innovations would be required before evaluating other elements of the marketing mix. Indeed, 
previous literature has shown that product innovation is central to the marketing mix elements of 
global firms (Beverland et al., 2007).  
Based on the need for foundational product validation, the consumer insights team built 
an immediate plan to test products; it also identified other insight gaps that had to be addressed 
to better inform the marketing mix and ultimately succeed in the Chinese market. An internal 
memo from the consumer insights team highlights these knowledge gaps: 
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“The current approach in China for RCP is to land a broad range of SKUs and see which 
of these sells.  Under time pressure to launch, this was considered the best option.  
However, if we are to build a successful business in China, we will have to have: 
i. An effective route to market. 
ii. Innovations that are both differentiated and relevant to the ch/user. 
In satisfying the second criteria Marketing and CMI [Consumer & Market Insights] have 
undertaken work to see which propositions are more likely to satisfy the second 
objective. The starting point for testing propositions has been to look at ideas already or 
about to be commercialized in the US …. This brings its own challenges in that the 
concepts for the most part have never been articulated, either as concept statements or 
brand keys, and this work has taken some time to do.” (#3) 
 
Beyond product concept tests, the consumer insights team identified additional data 
required to build a deep understanding of the market.  From Davies’ perspective, it was not ideal 
to make product testing the first order of business, as the organization lacked data about the 
Chinese market in the RCP categories of cleaning and refuse.  The consumer insights team also 
identified challenges with the testing-first approach: 
 
“This approach contains something of a random element in that there has been no data at 
all on the size of the segments, the intensity of the competition and so on, that would 
inform where we would test.” (#3) 
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The proposed research approach was the first of its kind for the RCP brand in China.  To 
date, all learnings had come from experiential learnings, informal discussions with customers, 
consumers, and management teams. The RCP China leadership team was optimistic about the 
context and insight that the product concept tests would provide, along with the implications for 
further optimizing the marketing mix.  
RCP administered product concept testing of its core product lines, defined as the North 
American market’s top-selling items.  A total of 31 current RCP product innovations from the 
refuse and cleaning categories that were commercially successful in North America and available 
in China were tested locally across the priority verticals of property management and hospitality.  
Products were evaluated on functional and emotional attributes, along with key performance 
indicators such as relevance, differentiation, and uniqueness.  Figure 10 shows an example from 
the test (the example is translated into English; all concepts were tested in Mandarin).   
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Figure 10. Example of a product concept test.  (#2) 
 
The testing resulted in a combined opportunity score that met internal action standards 
derived from Davies’ previous experience.  As Table 9 shows, 17 of the 31 concepts performed 
well on relevance and differentiation and met NB’s new standards. This was encouraging to 
Davies and the RCP marketing team; the testing showed that an assemblage of current product 
offerings could be succesful in the Chinese market’s hospitality and property management 
verticals.  The results both validated the organization’s continued investment in the region and 
highlighted a need to increase investment in awareness and trial-building efforts, specifically in 
advertising.  To date, there had been no broad-based marketing plans to drive awareness and trial 
for RCP.  Based on the concept results, NB was willing to provide the RCP marketing team the 
investment required to advertise in the brand. The concept results helped guide development of a 
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local marketing campaign around five of the product offerings that tested well, were considered 
relevant to local ch/users, and were differentiated from the competition. The results also guided 
which verticals to target, the communcations strategy, and the campaign’s media placement.  
Table 9. RCP Product Concept Test Results in China: Hospitality & Property Management 
Verticals (#4, #5)
 
 
4.4.3 Establish the Core marketing mix.  The grafted learning plan and the 
sensing/searching approach to acquiring consumer insights through the quantitative product 
concept tests significantly influenced RCP’s go-forward marketing mix.  The plan’s product 
portion became much more focused, specifically on core products passing action standards with 
Relevent Differentiated
Pass Action 
Standards
Relevent Differentiated
Pass Action 
Standards
Folding X-Cart Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A
HYGEN Microfiber Flat Mop Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vented Brute Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maximizer Mop Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HYGEN Series Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reach Flat Mop No Yes No No Yes No
Smoking Management No Yes No No Yes No
Classic Housekeeping Cart Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A
Executive Series No Yes No No Yes No
High Capacity Cleaning Cart N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes
Step-On Slim Jim No Yes No No Yes No
Utility and Maintenance Cart No No No No Yes No
BRUTE Utility Refuse Container Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slim Jim Container Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
V2 - Step-On Slim Jim Waste Container N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Structural Foam Tilt Trucks No No No No Yes No
Heavy Duty Platform Trucks Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Heavy Duty Utility Carts Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Triple Trolley Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Quick Cart No No No No Yes No
High Security Healthcare Cleaning Cart N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Recycling Platform - Profit Driven No No No No Yes No
Recycling Platform - Compliance Driven No No No No Yes No
ProSave Ingredient Management System Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A
WaveBrake Mop Bucket and Wringer System Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pulse Microfiber Mopping System (single) Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Pulse Microfiber Mopping System (double) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
HYGEN Disoposable Microfiber Cloths N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
HYGEN Microfiber N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
V2 - Executive Series Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Microfiber Flat Mop N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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ch/users. These products became known as the “core product” offering for China. Although the 
rest of the portfolio was still available for purchase, this core focus helped guide the sales team to 
further prioritize product recommendations for its customers and distributors. The marketing 
team created detailed training and sales materials to support the sales team in this effort.  These 
core products also became the main focus of all promotional efforts, including advertising, trade 
show exhibits, and trial programs. This ensured that locally relevant products were appropriately 
showcased to potential buyers.   
 The place element of the marketing mix was also reshaped.  The product concepts were 
specifically tested with the hospitality and property management verticals and, based on the 
results, the leadership team made a clear decision to penetrate these verticals in key geographies 
rather than take a broad approach.  Based on market data on hotel and property management sites 
and their growth forecasts, the team chose five cities as the geographic hubs for the RCP launch 
effort.  The sales team opened show rooms in these five cities to build a presence for the brand 
and give ch/users an opportunity to interact with the core product offering first-hand. Further, 
distributors could book the showroom and host customer meetings, which proved to be a great 
experience for potential customers. It brought the RCP product quality and design to life and 
showcased RCP’s full-solution offerings. The showrooms once again exemplified the brand’s 
commitment to the Chinese market, and they were well received by the customer base. Table 10 
offers an overview of the core marketing mix elements. 
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Table 10. Marketing Mix—Establish the Core 
 
 
4.4.4 Performance monitoring of organizational results. Sales continued to increase 
under the new focused marketing mix.  Year over year, the brand was seeing more than 30% 
growth (see Table 11), which was surpassing market performance.  The results heartened NB’s 
management team.  However, sales were still relatively small in comparison to the market size 
and RCP’s total market share was less than 2%.  The organization was pumping significant 
investment into the initiative, and it was optimistic that the new focus on core would drive 
 
Product Pricing Promotion Place
Continued to offer 528 items, 
but focused selling efforts on 
core products in Refuse, 
Cleaning & Mobility 
categories quantitively tested 
with Users & Choosers and 
passed company action 
standards (~200 Skus)
Local Pricing & Local 
Currency
Developed a new  print,  
outdoor & online advertising 
campaign to build awareness 
and trial of the brand. 
Campaign focused on core 
product offering and targeted 
Hospitality and Property 
Management verticals
Narrowed selling and 
distribution focus to 5 major 
cities - Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Chengdu
Cleaning Products 
specifically adapted for local 
users to meet size and 
usability needs
Pricing premium adjusted and 
ranged from 0% - 20% 
based on product 
differentiation versus market 
Advertising quantitatively 
tested with local consumers 
for persuasion and 
breakthrough and passed 
company action standards
Continued to focus on 
Hospitality and Property 
Management verticals with 
International firms and added 
locally run properties
Introduced 5 product 
showrooms in major cities to 
bring key customers and 
demonstrate product 
functionality and durability
5 product showrooms 
located in each major city
Marketing Mix Strategy
2013-2016
ESTABLISH CORE
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exponential growth in the coming years.  
Table 11. RCP Revenue Results (#2) 
  2015 2016 
Net Sales (revenue in millions)  $14.50   $21.00  
YOY Growth 37% 45% 
    
4.5 China Launch—Global/Local  
Continued progress was made across the marketing mix and RCP China’s results.  NB’s 
executive team was encouraged with the progress, but (as noted) sales results were relatively 
small in the overall market. The China management team targeted $100M in sales by 2019, 
which would require a significant growth trajectory; much progress remained to be made.  The 
product concept results and previous experiential learnings in the export phase made it clear to 
both the marketing and sales teams that core products would not be the sole driver of growth in 
the marketing mix. RCP needed a localized approach to augment its current offering. With 
guidance from the CMO and consumer insights team, RCP initiated the second phase of the 
consumer learning plan in China.  
4.5.1 Sensing and searching—ethnographic study. RCP needed additional consumer 
understanding to continue optimizing its marketing mix elements. In 2015, based on requests 
from Davies and the marketing team, CMI commenced an ethnographic study to provide 
contextual learnings around cleaning and refuse products in the two priority verticals (hospitality 
and property management).  Data were collected from 25 ch/users in hospitality and property 
management, along with building service contractors who held the cleaning contracts for top 
properties in China.  The data provided insight into ch/user perceptions, buying behaviors, and 
cleaning and refuse product usage.  Interview respondents were employed at various levels 
within their organizations, including as general managers, housekeeping managers, and cleaning 
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staff employees.   
The ethnographic study’s objective was to understand the “why” behind the quantitative 
product concept results.  Not only would it help explain why some concepts failed with ch/users, 
it would also provide insight into why some product concepts were accepted. The consumer 
insights team analyzed the quantitative data on the concepts, then used this data to prioritize 
product attributes and correlate them with relevance scores in the concept tests. In some 
instances, attributes rated differently than the marketing team expected (see Figure 11).  For 
example, the “lasts a long time” attribute did not correlate as highly with relevance as predicted, 
yet “durability” was a key communication claim and pillar for the RCP brand in the US and had 
therefore been adapted as a top claim in China as well.  Indeed, as noted earlier, the brand was 
positioned around performance and durability: “Only RCP outlasts and outpeforms anyone else.”  
Another key attribute the team sought to understand was the unexpectedly low relevance of 
“impact on my company’s image.” Based on the North American market, the team assumed that 
using RCP products in a property positively impacted the property’s image with patrons, and that 
the RCP brand gave people confidence regarding proper cleaning standards and a well-run 
property.  The team needed a deeper understanding of ch/users’ attitudes and habits concerning 
cleaning and refuse products and how they might influence RCP’s future product strategy.   
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Figure 11. Product attribute correlation to relevance metric. (#3) 
 
4.5.2 Results of the ethnographic study. “Quantitative research, by definition, is 
incapable of unearthing a ‘golden nugget,’ an epiphany that elucidates buying behavior.” 
(Doctoroff, 2005).  The ethnography study gave the China marketing team key insights not 
previously identified in the concept product testing.  The concept tests sought to validate the 
proposition of existing North American products, which had not been adapted for the Chinese 
market in any way. The results were useful, and they validated a majority of the product mix as 
relevant for local ch/users.  If many US product concepts had failed, NB may decided to exit the 
market or put all investment and growth expectations on hold until an appropriate product mix 
was established for the market.  Yet, despite the fact that many products passed the action 
standards, it was clear from the experiential learning and concept test results that North 
American product could not be the only aspect of the marketing mix. The ethnographic test 
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offered a context for how people were using cleaning and refuse tools. It also highlighted the 
unmet needs of choosers to inform potential innovation and new product strategies.  The 
ethnography also unearthed some local user challenges that a product or new tool would be 
unable to solve. It gave the RCP China team a view of RCP “categories in context.” As noted in 
the study design brief  (#5), the RCP China management team was looking for deeper qualitative 
perspectives on two topics: 
 Cultural challenges—and how to overcome them—in relation to the process of 
cleaning and handling of materials 
 Developing a true core competency around providing services to ch/users 
Obtaining deeper insights about choosers, users, and influencers from a cultural perspective, 
along with a better understanding of the “clean” concept in the Chinese market could help the 
organization refine its marketing mix elements even further. 
4.5.2.1 Overview of the ethnography approach. The NB consumer insights team 
contracted an agency partner to facilitate several types of learning activities, both formal and 
informal.  First, researchers conducted face-to-face formal interviews with general managers, 
housekeeping managers, and “ayis” (equivalent to maids/housekeepers in China). Second, they 
went on facility tours to observe products in use and videotape ayis cleaning hotel rooms and 
properties. 
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Table 12. Overview of Ethnography Participants (#5) 
Overview of Ethnography Fieldwork 
  
Locations Visited/Observed  Interviews Conducted 
Hospitality 
Two 5-star hotels, three 4-star 
hotels, and one budget/local 
chain 
Six general managers (GMs), five 
housekeeping managers, and four ayis 
(housekeepers) 
Property Management 
Four building service 
contractors 
Four GMs/VPs, four cleaning 
managers, and three ayis 
Expert Interviews  
Interviewed experts at RCP and at 
Diversey, a chemical provider with 
customers similar to RCP 
 
4.5.2.2. The cleaning landscape in China. Several characteristics unique to the Chinese 
market emerged from the ethnographic study. The professional cleaning landscape was 
experiencing accelerated growth rates due to continued property development across China, and 
it posed challenges for Chinese choosers that were different than those of their North American 
counterparts. Further, China’s retail, office space, and hotel properties were expanding at a rapid 
pace, whereas North America was experiencing declines in retail and office space, and hotel 
growth had remained relatively steady. China’s market growth created many constraints that RCP 
had to consider. Poor infrastracture was highlighted as a key barrier to properties carrying a full 
range of cleaning tools. Many properties in China—while luxurious on the outside—were 
deficient in proper planning for back-of-house support.  As a result, many properties lacked 
storage space for tools and lacked hot water in key locations required for cleaning.   
4.5.2.3 New vs. durable. The RCP team sought to understand how the local Chinese 
consumer perceived the durability proposition.  RCP managers were concerned about the recent 
product concept tests’ correlation of durability to relevance, which was lower than the team 
expected. In North America, durability had been a key selling point of the RCP brand, and it had 
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influenced how products were developed and manufactured, as well as which materials were 
used in manufacturing.  This robustness built into the products drove the brand’s premium price 
position and was a key differentiator from its competition.  In interviews, however, property 
managers emphasized why durable, long-lasting products might not be preferred: cleaning tools 
were often visible to their patrons, so having tools that appeared new was more important than 
durability.  Properties such as malls and office buildings were cleaned during the day, when the 
“day cleaning” ayis would continuously walk the properties and perform cleaning duties among 
the patrons.  Because of this, property managers highlighted the need for products that appeared 
new; as one put it, “The cheapest new mop still looks better than an expensive old mop.” (#5) 
Another manager said that he had no desire to order products that last a long time.  “I would 
rather spend money to buy something one-third cheaper than one that is more expensive and can 
be used for 5–10 years; we will not consider that.”(#5)  Given their high visibility, having new-
looking tools was considered a high priority, so tools should be durable enough to not rapidly 
appear worn down, but not be so durable that replacing them at regular intervals would be 
wasteful.   
This gave the RCP team much to consider in its product portfolio.  A less durable product 
range could be offered, but this was antithesis to the brand promise.  One approach considered 
was to redefine “durable” for the local market, developing products that were less durable than 
those in the US, but still durable enough for the local market to outperform the competition.  
Another consideration was to develop tools to teach local choosers about the higher return on 
investment (ROI) they could achieve by purchasing long-lasting products versus replacing them 
often.  ROI was a key consideration for North American choosers, but did not seem to be a 
consideration for Chinese choosers.  Because many properties guarantee cleaning contracts only 
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for short durations, ROI could be challenging; as one manager points out, “Most cleaning 
contracts for BSC [building service contractors] are only one-year long, so long-term benefits in 
tools are not appealing.” (#5)  The prominence of one-year contracts proved challenging for 
RCP.  If a building service contractor was guaranteed a cleaning contract only for one year, they 
had little incentive to buy tools that lasted beyond the contract duration.  Clearly, there were 
many implications to consider for a brand built on the idea that it “outperforms and outlasts” 
anyone else.  
4.5.2.4 A need for training and standards of clean. China’s accelerated property growth 
was driving demand for professional cleaning services and labor was putting a huge strain on 
property owners. Labor for cleaning professionals had become scarce.  General managers were 
experiencing high turnover rates and had difficulty staffing teams at full capacity. This resulted 
in a constant need to train staff members on operating procedures and how to use cleaning tools. 
Managers were also concerned about the caliber of talent in their organizations. Some managers 
believed that ayis could not retain information; as one put it, “It’s important for me to repeat 
important things at staff meetings, otherwise ayis always forget.”(#5) 
A primary driver behind tool choices and operating procedures was the “rough” behavior 
of cleaning staff.  The ayis were often migrants from rural parts of the country and lacked 
intuitive behaviors around care, discretion, and follow-through—the very factors that are often 
the mark of quality hotel services and high-end properties.  This aggressive behavior led some 
managers to come up with alternative solutions, such as taking away hospitality carts because 
staff members tend to run them into walls and doors or pile them too high with dirty linens and 
other goods.  Describing the reasoning for getting rid of the carts, one property owner lamented:  
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“And those ayis, they are not highly paid.  So, you can imagine when they cross the 
corridor where there are some doors—they drive the cart like a tank, and they hit my 
doors!  Because they are working very hard, they do not care.  So, this is to protect my 
corridor.  Secondly, in many new hotels, the corridor is not wide enough.” (#5) 
 
Property owners and building service contractors experienced pressure to maintain 
consistent standards in their properties, yet these standards had begun to continually increase in 
order to provide a competitive advantage to guests. One property manager felt the standards put 
in place by property owners were completely unattainable: 
 
“The cleaning standard is 100%, yet we can never achieve 100%. Everyone understands 
it, but it is not acheivable.” (#5) 
 
Further, given the class stratification in China, most housekeeping managers lacked 
practical cleaning experience.  Discussions with choosers exposed this need for practical hands-
on training and education to help these managers gain seasoned experience.  One property 
manager shared his frustration with the general caliber of talent, which dilutes operating 
standards as they filter down through his organization: 
 
“We have a saying that, when a company gives the standard to the VP, then to the project 
manager, the project manager will understand only 90% of the content.  By the time it 
gets to the supervisor, only 80% is left, and by the time it gets to the ayis, only 60% 
remains.” (#5) 
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International chemical and machine suppliers were highly regarded by the various 
stakeholders interviewed and could serve as a benchmark for RCP.  Strong brand awareness and 
loyalty for companies such as K’Archer and Diversey existed in part due to the quality of their 
goods, but had more to do with the services they provide in parallel to their core offering.  These 
companies help with training, inspection, tracking, and internal organization.  This helps 
choosers improve the knowledge of their workforce, which is especially important when 
choosers lack internal resources and training capabilities themselves.  Such companies thus had 
become trusted partners and pushed for exacting standards in an environment pressured to cut 
corners.  Educating workers and making solutions mistake-proof resonated with property 
managers.  A representative from K’Archer, a cleaning machine brand, discussed why they 
prioritize training: 
 
“Actually, in the process of cleaning, we train our cleaners to do cleaning service 
elegantly.  When you see [an ayi] holding a K’Archer vacuum cleaner, and working in a 
very elegant way, it is actually quite beautiful.  This is my feeling.” (#5) 
 
RCP offered little training or services to end users during this time, and any training 
offered was focused more on basic product usage than holistic cleaning operating procedures. In 
North America, standard operating procedures were developed by the properties or BSCs, so 
there was little need to teach cleaning professionals how to clean.  In China, RCP had the 
potential to establish itself as an expert in the cleaning tool market and fill a need in the 
professional cleaning industry.  Establishing cleaning protocols and training workers on these 
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standards could be a competitive advantage for the brand.  As with the cleaning machine, there 
was an opportunity to design tools that encouraged proper usage and provide standards to 
encourage graceful action on the part of the ayis.  Many of the machine brands also provided 
certifications when ayis completed trainings.  A manager highlighted how this elevated the role 
of the ayis; they are, he said, “highly valued because they give face to the profession.” (#5) That 
is, because ayis are visible and interact with guests, they are the “face” of a cleaning service 
company, so it is important that they project a positive image.  “When the cleaners come in, their 
first training is on detergent, the second is on use of training tools, and the third training is on 
courtesy and manners.” (#5) 
4.5.2.5 Opportunity for front of the house cleaning tools. Ch/users also identifed the 
need for products to be secure.  This was surprising to the RCP management team, as security 
was not a significant problem in North America.  In China, when ayis were cleaning in public 
spaces, crowds sometimes became unruly and vandalized the cleaning carts. Also, when carts 
were left unattended, patrons of the property would sometimes steal cleaning supplies to take 
home or to wash their cars in the property parking lots:  
 
“Ayis need to watch their cart in the basement, because people will take away cleaning 
cloth and buckets if ayis are not mindful.  Some customers will take away cleaning cloths 
and buckets to clean their cars parked in the underground garage.” (#5) 
 
Ayis need to stay near their carts and cleaning supplies to prevent theft and vandalism, 
which can be very costly to property owners and BSCs. General security was also cited as an 
issue, as patrons sometimes tamper with products and misuse them if they are left out in public.  
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One ayi spoke about hiding tools from plain view, noting that the ayis put “some buckets onto a 
cart in the back-of-house exit passageway, rather than having all carts use buckets because young 
children sometimes urinate in the them.” (#5)   Although security was not initially an issue that 
the RCP team had considered as a product requirement, it was identified as a potential way to 
drive differentiation versus the competition. 
4.5.2.5.1 Front of house vs. back of house. Unlike in North America, the study found that 
where products were actually used in China drove different purchase considerations for users. As 
noted earlier, many malls and office properties offer day cleaning, so ayis are continually 
cleaning and visible, which gives patrons confidence in a well-run property. High-end properties 
opted for RCP cleaning carts as a “star” cleaning touch point.  The RCP carts circulated among 
the shoppers and office workers and provided strong impressions of the cleaning service.  One 
office manager noted that “a ‘branded’ cart is a key touch-point for guests to see how prestigious 
the cleaning company is, and RCP carts have been very popular for this reason.” (#5) In these 
high-end scenarios, the RCP brand was highly valued for its premium, international status, and 
procurement managers often required the purchase of RCP brands: “Yellow is sparking.  
Rubbermaid is famous in America.  We have to choose RCP products for guest-facing 
categories.” (#5) 
Based on these learnings, RCP managers found that the current product offering in the 
marketing mix aligned most closely to front-of-house standards and activities in properties, as 
this is where choosers placed a premium on spending.  Visible cleaning is the touchstone service 
that showcases the value a management company brings to malls, offices, or other properties.  
Cleaners are the frontline “faces” who interact with the guests, and their daytime cleaning 
behaviors are on display for everyone to see.  Thus, beyond its current product offering, RCP saw 
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an opportunity to create tools with a product image and “signature” feel that enhanced the 
branded visibility of cleaning and reinforced the premium, professional image of the cleaning 
team’s work.  In image-centric China, the image of the tool appeared to be more important than 
the end cleaning result.  
Hotel managers took a similar approach to tools visible to guests.  If a hotel guest could 
see, touch, or interact with a tool, it must be of the best quality and brand.  If a cleaning process 
was invisible to guests, branding and quality became much less important to choosers.  In hotels, 
for example, room cleaning was rarely visible to the guest.  An international hotel property 
chooser explained it this way: 
  
“Because the process of most hotel cleaning is invisible to the guests, the end result is the 
only thing that matters.  Therefore, the hotel does not need to depict a ‘professional’ 
image with its tools.” (#5) 
 
A local hotel manager was even more adamant that professional tools and standards were 
unnecessary for room cleaning, stating that: “There are many reasons guests come to my hotel.  
Hygiene is not one of them.” (#5) 
This was a clear difference from North America, where few differences in buying 
patterns exist for back-of-house versus front-of-house usage.  Thus, it was essential to sales 
growth that RCP create value among patrons for tools used in these “invisible” back-of-house 
instances; that would only be possible, however, if patrons demanded that properties use quality 
products in all cases.  Another option was to better educate the hospitality industry about the 
short-term savings available when RCP products are used in synergy with one another—
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meaning, that is, that it was not necessarily cost effective to have two sets of tools.  A third 
consideration was to train housekeeping managers so they could become key advocates for the 
brand within their organizations.  Table 14 summarizes the differences identified in the role of 
cleaning between the property management (malls and office spaces) and hospitality verticals 
that RCP served.  These learnings gave the RCP marketing team several options to consider in 
relation to its marketing mix. 
Table 13. Comparison of Property Management & Hospitality Learnings 
 
4.5.3  The global–local marketing mix. The ethnographic study’s sensing and searching 
activity provided rich insights that the RCP China management had not previously unearthed. It 
explained the cultural implications of cleaning in China and provided insights into why Chinese 
ch/users had different needs than those in North America.  Although portions of the current core-
focused marketing mix were relevent, the Chinese market also needed local adaptations to meet 
unique demands.  As Table 14 shows, this knowledge acquired through sensing and searching 
Property Management Hospitality
Role of Cleaning Cleaning helps Property manager to 
justify the value of its services
Room cleaning is the baseline of 
services, elevation of hotel services 
doesn't come from cleaning
Meaning of Clean (Guest) Cleaning is the human-factor, the 
surrogate of service
Cleaning is part of the interior décor - it 
is an "invisible" service delivering the 
end result of clean space
What Cleaning is About (Ayi)
A location based responsibility and 
repetitive in order to maintain standard 
in the space
A task based mentality, ayi is to carry a 
series of tasks to ensure that the room is 
"ready"
How are Ayi perceived?
Frontline server of the Property 
Management Company, Premium 
cleaning = Premium Service "Cinderella" - not guest facing staff
Seeking innovative solutions on raising 
industry standard on achieving cleaning 
results
Key areas of interest are new solutions 
to reduce labor headcount, elevate 
labor capability, improving productivity
Interest in premium tools to elevate the 
appearance of cleaning standards
Comparison of Two Market Verticals - Overview
Innovation needs in Cleaning 
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caused the organization to yet again reshape some of its marketing mix elements. However two 
elements of the 4Ps had stabilized: the RCP team did not change pricing or placement strategies 
in this phase, as the study did not indicate any red flags or needed changes in either area.  
 The RCP team initiated new promotional activity to address some of the challenges 
highlighted in the ethnogrpahic study.  First, it developed ROI calculators for choosers.  These 
calculators were designed to compare the actual costs of buying a competitive product, along 
with the subsequent replacement costs, compared to purchasing an RCP product with long-
lasting properties and warranties. They also calculated cost-in-use, so owners could compare 
usage rates among brands. RCP continued to believe product durability was a necessary tenant of 
the brand, and chose not to use cheaper materials, less costly manufacturing processes, or 
otherwise change its product make-up. The ROI calculator was a way to teach choosers the long-
term value of owning RCP products.  
Another addition to the promotional element was developing a partnership with the 
global Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA).  RCP had strong relationships with 
BOMA in North America, but had not yet formed this partnership with the local chapter in 
China.  BOMA and RCP discussed a joint initiative to develop a SOP manual for cleaning in 
China to define the “gold standard” of cleaning.  This gave RCP the opportunity to be one of the 
initial authors of cleaning standards in China.  With this initiative, RCP had the chance to speak 
at local conferences and on panels with building property owners and managers. It also looked to 
develop a certification program, including trainings and a set of test instruments for 
housekeeping managers and ayis.  This certification program would not only ensure that 
employees were properly trained on cleaning standards, but it would also give them the 
recognition they desired (as identified in the ethnography study). 
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Finally, RCP looked to develop local product for the Chinese market.  The ethnographic 
study gave the marketing team several ideas about how to solve users’ needs in both the 
hospitality and property management verticals.  It planned to use these insights to build benefit-
driven products specifically relevant to the unique challenges users faced.  These product 
concepts would be tested early in the development process to ensure that they uniquely met 
consumer needs, and the team would continue to validate the products with ch/users along the 
way.  RCP planned to launch these new innovations in 2017 alongside its current product 
offering. 
Table 14 offers a summary of the new Global–Local marketing mix. 
Table 14. Marketing Mix—Global/Local 
 
4.5.4  Performance monitoring—the results. RCP is now in the midst of executing its 
newly informed marketing strategy. This study concluded in 2016, however, so results are not 
available on the organization’s performance in 2017 and beyond. 
 
Product Pricing Promotion Place
Continue with  528 SKUS 
Available and focus on core US 
products that tested well with 
choosers & users
Continue with current pricing 
strategy of 0-20% premium to 
market leader (20% for 
innovation/differentiation)
Continue with Core advertising 
campaign, showrooms and 
previous PR and trial campaigns.
Continue focus on 48 distributors 
with majority of sales in 5 major 
cities
Create a specific line of tools for 
PM and Hospitality Verticals 
based on learnings
Develop partnership with 
BOMA, a regarded association 
for Building Owners and property 
managers to develop an industry 
cleaning standard and guide that 
would elevate RCP as the "gold 
standard" in cleaning
Added Building Service 
Contractors as a direct sales 
focuses versus accessing through 
distributors
Create a SERVICE to provide 
training and continual monitoring 
post-purchase 
Develop ROI calculators for 
choosers to teach the long term 
and cost-in-use savings potential 
through purchasing durable, long-
lasting products
Marketing Mix Strategy
2017 and Beyond
Global/Local
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5.0 Discussion and Contributions 
This research highlights several themes that run throughout RCP’s market entry strategy 
in China.  First, RCP’s marketing mix is emergent.  It has both realized and unrealized aspects 
based on the TMT’s original intentions and stated strategy.  Throughout the marketing strategy 
development process, learning occurs and, as knowledge is acquired, marketing mix elements are 
revised or sometimes changed all together.  Second, this knowledge acquisition occurs 
throughout each phase of the emerging strategy, and in some cases, multiple learning behaviors 
were evident in a single temporal phase.  Four of the five knowledge acquisition behaviors were 
displayed throughout the research period.  The fifth—vicarious learning—was not evident in this 
context, possibly because the RCP organization had considerable experience in the US market 
and, given its home market leadership, might not have seen the benefit in monitoring or 
benchmarking the competition.  It is also possible that vicarious learning took place, but was not 
formally documented or discussed in organization strategy sessions.  Third, knowledge 
acquisition is the impetus for reshaping the strategy.  In some instances, specific types of 
knowledge acquisition accelerated this process.  Finally, as the strategy emerged, the 
organization’s results improved.  This is not to say, however, that the strategy should be deemed 
successful per se.  Performance monitoring on the market mix’s next phase has yet to take place, 
and the organization’s results should be measured over time as RCP continues to establish itself 
in the Chinese market. 
Based on the study’s longitudinal nature, the strategy building process can be examined 
over time versus solely at its inception.  NB is dedicated to RCP’s success in China, and—as an 
organization focused on learning—it works to shape and reframe the strategy based on new 
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experiences and the knowledge that results.  Given this context, the organization did not cling to 
its initial strategy (i.e., Export Model), nor did it deem it a failure to revise that strategy.  Rather, 
the performance monitoring of sales revenue and continued acquisition of knowledge about the 
local market gave NB the inputs it needed to guide strategy revisions, allowing new strategy to 
emerge.  As in Mintzberg’s analogy of a potter (1988), RCP formed a marketing strategy for 
China and, through knowledge acquisition, molded each element of its marketing mix over time. 
Four knowledge acquisition behaviors were evident in this study.  RCP’s learnings were 
both planned and unplanned and both were beneficial to shaping the marketing mix.  The initial 
marketing strategy was founded on congenital learning, as RCP used its experience in North 
America to make decisions about its approach to entering China.  Unplanned learning, including 
the new management team’s experiential learning upon entering the Chinese market, gave that 
team a better understanding of what Chinese distributors needed to be successful and offered 
insight into how RCP was viewed compared to the competition.  The organization’s planned 
learnings included grafting, by adding new leadership with substantial experience launching into 
new markets, and sensing and searching, which directed the formal studies.  Both approaches 
gave RCP deep insights into the consumers, their perceptions, and how they might use different 
RCP products.  Indeed, these planned learning initiatives appear to have accelerated the shaping 
and reframing of the strategy itself. 
The organization reshaped its marketing strategy as it acquired knowledge.  The TMT 
continued to redefine marketing mix elements to better align with the OL.  Internally, these 
changes were not defined as strategy failures or strategies unrealized, but rather as indicative of 
the continuous learning and inputs needed when entering a foreign market.  The Chinese market 
is complex, and RCP’s continued knowledge acquisition highlighted the need for organizational 
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changes.  The initial marketing mix was not one that could drive continual growth over the long 
term.  These marketing strategy shifts show the organization’s commitment to success in the 
Chinese market and its ability to learn and apply the learnings within the strategy context.  In 
addition, these learnings can also be applied to other NB divisions considering a launch into 
China or other emerging markets, and can both inform and accelerate their approach to strategy 
development. 
As the strategy emerged, RCPs revenue growth markedly improved.  Throughout each 
phase of the strategy process, knowledge acquisition gave the management team insights about 
how to continue unlocking growth opportunities in the Chinese market.  Conversely, in the 
strategy’s initial stage, when the marketing mix had yet to change and new learnings were not 
applied, revenues were stagnant.  Therefore, knowledge acquisition and its infusion into strategy 
was a key element to reinvigorating RCP’s market growth.  
5.1. Limitations 
This study has three identified limitations.  First, because the researcher is an employee 
of NB and the RCP marketing team’s former leader, biases can clearly come into play.  Second, 
because this is a single case study, the results are not generalizable. They can, however, provide a 
framework for future statistical analysis. Finally, the data analyzed is archival and secondary, so 
additional research was not possible when information gaps arose. 
5.2. Contributions and Implications for Future Research 
Using the concepts of emergent strategy and the OL sub-concept of knowledge 
acquisition as a theoretical framework, this study examines how NB, and RCP specifically, 
optimized and surfaced its marketing strategy in China over time. 
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This study not only shows how the market mix elements emerged and evolved, but also 
describes the results that followed.  The study further shows how different knowledge acquisition 
aspects and behaviors informed decisions throughout each phase of the marketing strategy.  As 
the following sections describe, the research advances knowledge in both theory and practice. 
5.2.1 Contribution to theory.  The study’s longitudinal nature shows that the marketing 
strategy was not formulated and then unrealized, but rather its elements emerged over time and 
were optimized based on the firm’s behaviors.  The study brought forth the idea that 
organizational knowledge acquisition was the impetus to this emergent strategy process and 
drove change within the strategy’s temporal stages.  Four of the five knowledge acquisition types 
were evident, and grafting played a significant role in the firm’s learning.  NB’s new leadership 
grafted new processes and approaches to the marketing mix, which optimized and accelerated 
performance compared to the previous learning types.  Previous work has explored experiential 
and congenital learning in detail, but little work has been done to identify the importance of 
grafting and its impact on a strategy’s trajectory and its realization in subsequent performance.  
This is an area that future research can explore in other strategy contexts.  There is also an 
opportunity for other OL aspects to be combined with emergent strategy to determine how OL 
interplays with the emergent strategy concept.  
 In this context, knowledge acquisition occurred over time, so elements of the marketing 
strategy began to stabilize.  In the initial stages, the elements changed significantly.  As time 
passed and knowledge was continually acquired, however, certain elements were minimally 
refined or remained unchanged.  It appears that, the deeper and more deliberate the learning, the 
more refined and optmized the strategy becomes. Figure 12 shows  each of the 4Ps and how they 
emerged or were realized during RCP’s Chinese market entry phases. As the graphs show, each 
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element achieved varying rates of realization and some elements continue to emerge.  This is a 
concept to be further studied; Figure 13 shows a potential framework for that future exploration.  
 
Figure 12.  RCP’s marketing mix elements and their emergence over time. 
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Figure 13.  A framework to test combining knowledge acquisition and strategy. 
5.2.2 Contribution to practice. Grafting is an area for practitioners to consider in the 
strategy development context.  In this study, grafting had a positive impact on OL and appeared 
to accelerate strategy development.  This requires further research and analysis, but could have 
implications for organizations and their hiring strategies.  A deeper understanding of grafting 
could help organizations determine when it is best to graft new talent into an organization by 
hiring from outside rather than hiring and/or promoting from within. 
Another key area of interest emerging from this study are the concepts of “front of house” 
and “back of house” product offerings in China.  Based on the cultural context of “face,” it could 
be interesting for marketers to explore how these usages influence consumer buying behaviors in 
other product categories.  This could have implications for product development approaches, 
depending not only on where the product is used, but also on where others observe its use. 
Examining one firm’s market entry strategy in China revealed the knowledge acquisition 
behaviors influencing its marketing mix and decision making.  This provides a framework for 
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firms considering new markets and how to approach and develop a learning plan prior to entry.  
By implementing these concepts prior to launch, other firms might improve their performance 
and more effectively guide their learning.  The study also shows the time, resources, and patience 
required when entering new markets.  It further provides context on the danger of immediately 
dismissing a strategy or deeming it a failure; knowledge acquisition can help shape that strategy 
over time.  
In conclusion, David Knights and Frank Mueller said it best: 
“If strategy is in a continuous process of becoming, analytic attention is 
directed towards those practices that are associated with its construction in 
inertial, stabilizing or changing paths of becoming.  Most importantly, in 
studying the becoming of activity, we acknowldege that a strategist’s work is 
never ‘done,’ strategy is always an unfinished project under construction” 
(2004).   
Likewise, there is more to learn in relation to strategy itself, and how knowledge acquisition 
plays into its formation. The researcher looks forward to continued advancement in this realm. 
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7.0 APPENDICES  
 
Name of Internal 
Document 
Region/
Year 
Document Type Type of 
Respondents 
Type of Data Sample 
Size 
Ref
# 
RCP Brand Pyramid 
North 
America 
2012 
Internal Marketing 
Document 
N/A N/A  N/A 
 
 
1 
RCP China Strategy 
China 
2013 
Internal Marketing 
Document 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
2 
RCP Concept Test Memo 
China 
2013 
Internal Marketing 
Document 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
3 
China RCP Route-to-e to 
Market Study Project 
China 
201 
 
Refuse 
Cleaning 
Users & 
Choosers 
Qualitative:  
-interviews 
 
Quantitative:  
65 question 
survey 
- 
Observation 
Total N 
= 25 
N(I) = 
25 
N(O) =7 
 
 
4 
Decoding Professional 
Clean Ethnographic Study 
China 
2015 
Refuse 
Cleaning 
Users & 
Choosers 
Qualitative: 
-interviews 
 
Quantitative: 
65 question 
survey 
- 
Observation 
Total N 
N= 25 
N N(I) 
= 25 
N N(O) 
= 7 
 
 
5 
Product Concept Test 1 
China 
2013 
 
Refuse 
Cleaning 
Users & 
Choosers 
Quantitative: 65 
question survey 
(Ordinal) 
 
Qualitative:  
optional write-
ins/verbatim 
N(C) = 
150 
N(PM) 
= 75 
N(Hosp
) = 75 
 
 
 
 
6 
Product Concept Test 2 
China 
2013 
Refuse 
Cleaning 
Users & 
Choosers 
Quantitative: 65 
question survey 
(Ordinal) 
 
Qualitative:  
optional write-
ins/verbatim 
N(B) = 
150 
N(PM) 
= 75 
N(HOS
P) = 75 
 
 
 
7 
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